Any attempt to deal with this topic will likely raise more questions than provide answers, since the position adopted by Mahmud `Abbas, as president of the Palestinian Authority (hereinafter PA), cannot be divorced from his being at the same time the head of the FATH movement. This is also true of the Palestinian government and its various departments which in effect is the government of the FATH movement, each department being headed by a member of the movement’s Central Committee. The positions adopted by that government do not reflect Palestinian public opinion for recent polls have shown a massive rise in the popularity of resistance and an equally massive drop in approval ratings of the PA, its officials, and its policies.[1] In addition, other standpoints and trends adopted by some leading figures and “currents” within FATH or on its margins, do not agree with the position taken by `Abbas and the official leadership. Indeed, they criticize that position and reject it. This state of affairs has long plagued FATH which suffers from a major rift among its ranks as between a revolution now suppressed and the ideal of revolution espoused by successive generations. This fact is clearly shown in elections to student councils in Palestinian universities, where the FATH lists are named after their martyred leaders and declare themselves to be “the first bullet fired and the first stone flung.” But they evade answering questions to do with the security coordination with the Israeli occupation regime and the recognition of the enemy. In view of this atmosphere of alienation currently afflicting the movement, the movement’s cadres now emphasize the history of the movement and not its present situation.[2]
The position adopted by Mahmud `Abbas[3]
Based upon statements made by `Abbas and upon his interviews, messages and speeches, one can deduce his declared position regarding the Tufan al-Aqsa operation and the ensuing war to be as follows:
-
Rejection of all killing of civilians or violence against them committed by the two sides (i.e. Israel and HAMAS) and calling for the release of prisoners, civilians and captives. This position was adopted from the early days of the war and has not changed. In fact, at the sole meeting of the FATH Revolutionary Council held in early February 2024, `Abbas called for the unconditional release of Israeli captives out of his alleged concern for Gaza’s civilians and launched into a sharp attack on the HAMAS leadership and the Tufan al-Aqsa [4]
-
He called for a unity of ranks and avoidance being drawn into civil discord. But this remained mere verbiage and did not translate into any actual measures to achieve this goal. No direct contact has been reported between `Abbas and the leaders of HAMAS, and no invitation to a meeting was extended to the leaders of other political movements as had happened at the time of the Trump-Netanyahu “Deal”.
-
He stressed the non-violent policy of the PLO which pursues political and legal methods to attain its goals, and further affirmed his firm adherence to international law, peaceful popular resistance, and political action to achieve nationalist objectives.
-
He rejected the forcible eviction of Palestinians, considering it to be another Nakba befalling the Palestinian people, and further rejected separating Gaza from the West Bank, Gaza being an integral part of the land of Palestine. He stated that his own responsible post derives from the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As phrased by Nabil Abu Rudaina, `Abbas is the head of Palestinian legitimacy, and the center of decision-making is in Ramallah.
-
He condemned the suspension of funding of UNRWA by certain countries and of the monies due to the PA by Israel.
-
He affirmed that what happened on October 7 was a result of political deadlock, preventing the Palestinian people from deciding their destiny, and reaffirmed his readiness to be involved once again in a political process.
These being the declared and official standpoints, what is noticeable is the paralysis in all official organs of FATH and the PA. The movement’s Revolutionary Council met only once, four months after the outbreak of war, when it heard the speech of its head, whereas the members of the Central Committee were invited to a joint meeting attended by tens of people among whom were members of the Executive Committee, heads of security agencies, cabinet ministers and Muslim and Christian clergy, and these were dubbed the “Palestinian leadership.” However, the Central Council of the PLO was not invited to that meeting nor were its members contacted. It is likely that deliberately ignoring these leadership institutions came as a result of the advice proffered to the presidency of the PA regarding the need to wait for a few weeks until the dust had settled as regards Israel’s military onslaught. Accordingly, the PA’s president instructed the members of the Central Committee and all other officials to remain silent and not to issue any statements.[5] When `Abbas Zaki, a member of that Committee, defied these instructions, lauded the Tufan al-Aqsa operation and its leaders, and added that Palestine was safe and sound as long as Muhammad al-Dayf and Yahya al-Sinwar were safe and sound, an official FATH statement was issued declaring that `Abbas Zaki was not empowered to make any statements.
To further clarify this state of affairs, and on October 7, `Abbas called a meeting of the heads of the security agencies plus two other meetings on October 18, 2023 and on February 18, 2024, for what was described as the Palestinian leadership, with four months separating these two meetings. He also called one sole meeting of the Executive Committee on December 25, 2023, i.e. some two months after the outbreak of war, in addition to the meeting of the Revolutionary Council mentioned above. It is likely that the failure of these leadership bodies to meet and the total silence of most FATH leaders were behind the reasons that led some figures close to the prisoner Marwan al-Barghuti to actively join the popular demonstrations and strikes in the West Bank. It further led Ahmad Ghunaym, a leading figure of that political current, to urge the various factions and the members of the PLO Executive Committee to issue a call for unity of the Palestinian standpoint and creating a unified command, calls that Mahmud `Abbas had previously ignored. Ghunaym criticized the policy adopted by the official leadership as regards the war on Gaza and stated that the leadership had opted for silence under the impression that this would protect the West Bank and the FATH movement. He added: how can one separate one part of one’s existence from the rest of one’s existence? The “Head of the Household” should have shouldered his political responsibility in all cases even if he was not a direct party to what was happening, since the job of a true leader was to act and be present in even the direst of circumstances. Failure to face and come to grips with the genocidal war on Gaza was unacceptable, both politically and from the viewpoint of the struggle.[6]
Furthermore, Jamal Hawil,[7] a member of FATH’s Revolutionary Council, made a number of statements during TV interviews where he outlined his views on the Tufan al-Aqsa battle and its requirements, emphasized the achievements of the resistance on October 7, and described these as a strategic Palestinian victory over the Israeli occupation, prepared with great care, and propelled by logical causes that could not be ignored or understood outside the framework of resistance (such as the siege that had been inflicted on Gaza). Hawil repeatedly affirmed that the statements and standpoints issued by the PA were not commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis and of the battle that was raging. He renewed his call for the PA to withdraw its recognition of the Israeli occupation, to sever all ties with it, and to speedily issue an invitation to a meeting of all heads of Palestinian movements where a new national dialogue could take place. The meeting would have on its agenda the task of repairing popular and official Palestinian unity and the formulation of a political program in accord with Palestinian nationalist principles, is commensurate with the huge sacrifices made, and recognizes the inevitability of participation in decision making by diverse Palestinian movements and groups.
Hawil pointed out that HAMAS was a Palestinian movement, a basic constituent of the Palestinian people and an essential partner in representing that people. This, in Hawil’s view, made it imperative for HAMAS and the al-Jihad al-Islami to be present within the framework of the PLO and of certain understandings and compromises imposed by current events on all Palestinian movements, especially HAMAS and FATH. He urged abandonment of the political and authoritarian fragmentation of Palestine and affirmed that the ties linking the West Bank to Gaza and the other occupied territories constituted a strong motive to unite efforts and to recognize the Zionist threat to them all, and the subsequent need to challenge it. Hawil called on Mahmud `Abbas to initiate in his official and personal capacity a national dialogue with Isma`il Haniyya and stressed that this accords with the current need for intra-Palestinian coordination that preserves the unity of the Palestinian people and of its various arenas of struggle, and viewed the current circumstances as an important opportunity to rearrange and regulate intra-Palestinian ties, especially in view of the clear popular support for resistance.
Hawil affirmed that his call for a meeting of all movements and the formation of a “National Salvation” cabinet and a “Government of National Unity” is the primary and necessary measure to discuss a future Palestinian leadership and argued that HAMAS was an inseparable component of the Palestinian struggle. He repeated his call for Mahmud `Abbas to implement the resolutions adopted by the Central Council to stop all coordination with the occupation regime and withdraw recognition of it, and appealed to all Palestinian movements in the West Bank to engage the enemy with all available means of resistance, including armed resistance. He further affirmed the need for a Palestinian Intifada to be protected and aided by the Palestinian security agencies, once the functions of these agencies had been transformed, and criticized the positions and declarations of Mahmud `Abbas which he described as falling well below the minimum required for supporting the people of Gaza. These views accord with those of the al-Aqsa Brigades and other groups close to FATH who had joined the fighting in Gaza as well the popular and armed resistance in the West Bank. These brigades were represented in local resistance groups some of which had been formed prior to October 7, such as the Jenin Brigades and later the Tulkarm, Tubas and other brigades. Before the war on Gaza, the Palestinian security agencies had been able to subdue a similar grouping in Nablus known as the “Lions’ Den” but failed to do so with the Jenin Brigade despite repeated attempts. It was noticeable that these security agencies had kept their distance since the beginning of the war but in late February resumed their pursuit of armed groups and arresting their members.
In contrast to this viewpoint, the letter addressed to Mahmud `Abbas by Ahmad Hallas, head of mobilization and organization in the Gaza Strip and member of FATH’s Central Committee, reflected the official position as this was also expressed in that movement’s propaganda. This viewpoint focused on what that “ill-conceived war” had brought, increasing the burdens of the Palestinian people. Hallas described the Tufan al-Aqsa operation as a “great adventure” and a trifling with the destiny of a people. This standpoint perhaps became even more clear in the declaration issued by FATH on March 15, 2024, in an answer to the objections expressed by HAMAS, al-Jihad al-Islami, the Popular Front and the National Initiative to the decision of Mahmud `Abbas to the appointment of Muhammad Mustafa to head a new government without a national consensus, and considered that decision to be a further sign of individualistic conduct and a deepening of divisions. In answer, the FATH statement accused HAMAS of leading Israel to reoccupy the Gaza Strip and that the “adventure” of October 7 had brought about a Nakba more grievous and severe than the Nakba of 1948. However, Bassam Zakarneh, a member of the Revolutionary Council Of FATH, stated on his social media profile that the FATH statement did not speak for the movement since it was not issued by an official organ of that movement and did not accord with the views of the movement defined in resolutions of its congresses. Likewise, the al-Aqsa brigades in the West Bank attacked that same statement describing those who issued it as collaborationist and Zionist-inclined.
However, no analysis of FATH’s standpoint on the Gaza war and its aftermath can be complete without a discussion of another current in that movement, i.e. the current led by Muhammad Dahlan, a leading figure who had been expelled from the Central Committee. This is known as the “Reformist Current.” A strong advantage of this current is the fact that it is centered in Gaza. Because of its close links to the UAE and Egypt it has been active in offering humanitarian aid and active too in its political contacts and in changing the balance of power. Thus, it became obvious that Nasir al-Qudwa, a member of FATH’s Central Committee, whose membership was suspended after he formed a separate electoral list, began to coordinate his future political moves with the Reformist Current with the aim of making him a candidate to head an interim government. It was noted that he had participated, along with Samir al-Mashharawi, a leader of the Reformists, in a meeting with HAMAS leaders in Doha, which later culminated in a meeting between Muhammad Dahlan and Ismai`il Haniyya, also in Doha. All these meetings were held without any contacts with Mahmud `Abbas and the PA, though each side clearly needed the other. For Gaza cannot be governed without the participation of HAMAS which, in turn, needs UAE funds to commence reconstruction, and also needs good relations with Egypt. HAMAS hopes to attain both these objectives through a carefully calibrated relationship with the Reformist Current in FATH.
Conclusion
Inside the FATH movement there is a crisis of leadership, of program and of discourse. No consensus exists as to the movement’s goals and the means of struggle at this stage of the struggle for liberation and the nature of relations with the occupation regime. A movement of national liberation cannot derive its legitimacy from the occupier while preserving its character as a national liberation movement. If FATH ignores this rift between the ideology of the movement and the conduct of its leaders, it is in danger of losing its position as leader of a national liberation movement after having abandoned resistance and after confining itself to a style of peaceful resistance which lacks vision and realistic instruments to carry this through, thus allowing other movements to lead the resistance.
If, in the case of Palestine, the sources of legitimacy are the legitimacy of resistance against occupation and of the electoral process, the current leadership has paralyzed both these sources by abandoning the first and paralyzing the second. Despite the fact that the occupation regime has Mahmud `Abbas in its gunsight, the leadership does not react accordingly but still clings to illusions peddled to it by the USA which speaks of a renewed leadership, constructed by the USA, and befitting the relationship with the occupation regime.[8]
In sum, the FATH movement, which today stands at a crossroads, ought to realize that the aftermath of this war will engulf it. So, it either persists in swallowing the illusions of a political settlement or else contributes with others to formulate a new Palestinian program which unites the Palestinian people and grasps the chance afforded by this war while facing the dangers it has engendered.
[1] للاطلاع على استطلاع الرأي الصادر عن المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية، يُنظر: المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية، شوهد في 10/3/2024، على الرابط.
[2] أحمد غنيم، لقاء على تطبيق زووم ضمن مجموعة قادة الحوار والفكر الفتحاوي.
[3] رُصدت هذه المواقف من وكالة الأنباء الفلسطينية (وفا).
[4] مقابلة مع أحد أعضاء المجلس الثوري.
[5] مقابلة مع أحد أعضاء اللجنة المركزية.
[6] "مؤتمر صحفي تعقده لجنة متابعة نداء فلسطين"، شوهد في 10/3/2024.
[7] رُصد 19 لقاءً تلفزيونياً لعضو المجلس الثوري لحركة "فتح" جمال حويل (وهو من الشخصيات القيادية في منطقة جنين)، على عدد من القنوات العربية ("العربي"، و"الغد"، و"القاهرة نيوز"، و"النيل"، و"الميادين").
[8] أحمد غنيم، مصدر سبق ذكره.