First Reactions—Solidarity with Whom and for What?
The attacks of October 7, 2023, immediately generated a sense of deep shock in Israel. Shortly thereafter, it became clear that this date would become a watershed moment for Israelis[1], Palestinians, and the international community. The killing of approximately 1,200 Israelis, the abduction of over 200 more, and the total breakdown of Israel’s security in the south not only shocked the country but also triggered immediate reactions of support, including from the EU and its member states.
When Ursula von der Leyen, the German conservative politician and EU Commission president since 2019, visited Israel one week after the attacks, she stated: “In the face of this unspeakable tragedy, there is only one possible response: Europe stands with Israel.”[2] As she refrained from referring to international law in her remarks, this was interpreted as a carte blanche for Israel’s military response. The German chancellor Olaf Scholz and much of the German political establishment echoed her stance: “There is only one place for Germany at this time, and that is by Israel’s side. This is what we mean when we say: Israel’s security is part of Germany’s raison d’état.”[3]
However, after Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared a “complete siege” on the Gaza Strip on October 9 in order to fight “human animals,”[4] the consequences of this inflammatory rhetoric unfolded quickly, resulting in a bombing campaign killing Palestinian civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure. The death toll was rising quickly, with 10,000 Palestinians killed by Israel in the first month and hundreds of thousands internally displaced, mostly from the northern to the central and southern Gaza Strip in the first weeks.
While most EU countries emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself, it was gradually supplemented by the demand to act “within the framework of international humanitarian law and human rights law.”[5] However, there remained a striking absence of messages of solidarity with the Palestinian people. Instead, on October 9, 2023, the commission declared an “urgent review of the EU’s financial assistance for Palestine.”[6] Although the review was completed in November 2023, and the EU declared that “no evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes,”[7] many projects and organizations have experienced sharp funding declines ever since.
Even before October 7, Israel’s terror accusations against six Palestinian human rights organizations had led to similar developments, although the Israeli defense ministry, which brought forward the accusations, did not provide any evidence. Similarly, in late January 2024, Israel accused several UNRWA employees to have taken part in the October 7 attacks. Although no evidence supporting the claims was presented, several states including the U.S. and EU members states froze their contributions to the agency.[8] Weeks later, the EU reinstated funding to the UNRWA after the latter agreed to an audit by EU-appointed experts; Canada, Australia, and Sweden also followed in resuming funding to the agency.
Cautious Criticism, Double Standards, and the EU’s Failure to Define Its Role in the War
During several Foreign Affairs Council meetings—the key forum for the discussion of the EU’s foreign policy—the high representative briefed foreign ministers on the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza. In November 2023, he also outlined basic elements for future EU engagement on the basis of three “yes’s” and three “no’s.” Accordingly, the EU should help prevent both the “forced displacements of Palestinians in and from Gaza” and “the reoccupation by Israel or a safe haven for Hamas in Gaza,” and help avoid the “dissociation of Gaza from the overall Palestinian issue.” On the other hand, it should support “the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza” and a “stronger involvement of the Arab countries.” And finally, the EU should increase its involvement, “in particular on the political process, in building the Palestinian state.”[9] In the meantime, however, the Israeli government has made it clear on various occasions that it has different plans. Netanyahu proudly declared that he had always worked against a Palestinian state,[10] and he and several government representatives made it clear that Israel aspires to maintain security control over Gaza.
With the massive bombardment of the Gaza Strip, described as one of the most destructive wars in the twentieth century,[11] it became clear at an early stage that civilians were primarily paying the price, while the goal to “eliminate” Hamas appeared increasingly futile. Most experts had warned from the beginning that the idea to use military means to eradicate the movement’s capacities and influence was illusionist due to its social and political roots, and its bases and support outside the Gaza Strip. After months of war, the scope of destruction in Gaza is unprecedented, with up to 70 percent of housing fully or partially destroyed, and an almost complete eradication of civil infrastructure, including the main universities, most hospitals, sewage and water systems, and electricity networks. More than 1.8 million Palestinians in Gaza remain displaced, and 2.2 million—the whole population—face severe levels of food insecurity or famine. However, the EU has not confronted Israel’s policy of blockade and its significant obstruction of humanitarian access but expressed support in March 2024 for air-dropping humanitarian aid and plans for a sea corridor. Nevertheless, humanitarian professionals have deemed these measures completely insufficient and inadequate.
While several EU leaders have now issued more warnings and expressed outspoken criticism of Israel’s destructive war on Gaza, they have fallen short of engaging in any meaningful campaign for a ceasefire or concrete action to change course and halt the hostilities. The EU Parliament called for a ceasefire on January 18, 2024, but with the conditions that all hostages are “immediately and unconditionally released and the terrorist organization Hamas is dismantled.”[12] In February, Hungary blocked a common position of all member states, leading to a statement by the other 26. The statement warns against an Israeli attack on Rafah and asks Israel to “respect the 26 January order of the International Court of Justice, which is legally binding. This requires an immediate humanitarian pause that would lead to a sustainable ceasefire, the unconditional release of all hostages and the provision of humanitarian assistance.”[13]
Despite this, some governments, including the German government, have remained ambiguous, at best, about their criticism. Germany abstained in two UN General Assembly resolutions demanding a ceasefire but did not adopt a proactive policy in favor of a ceasefire, nor did it condemn Israel’s violations of international law. On the contrary, German politicians on various occasions have denied any wrongdoing on behalf of the Israeli army and dismissed as “absurd” the allegations of genocide examined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.
Member states remained divided. In contrast to the German chancellor and foreign minister, who argued against a ceasefire and deliberately blamed Hamas for the mounting deaths in Gaza, French President Emmanuel Macron called for a ceasefire early on.[14] In November, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo sharply criticized Israel’s attacks on civilians in the Gaza Strip and the lack of humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, the Spanish and Irish governments addressed a letter to Ursula von der Leyen requesting that the EU Commission “undertake an urgent review of whether Israel is complying with its obligations, including under the EU-Israel Association Agreement.”[15]
The EU has failed to act according to its own values in response to the events in Israel and Gaza. The continued inaction and what was perceived as a one-sided positioning of the EU drew criticism and accusations of double standards not only among Palestinians. Europe sees itself as a global player and norm-setter with regard to human rights, international law, and conflict resolution. However, it has neither taken a clear stance on a ceasefire to end an armed conflict in its vicinity nor clearly defined its own political role and responsibilities.
Policy Options for the EU
The EU and Germany, respectively, have significant leverage that they could utilize. Germany is Israel’s second most important trade partner after the US and one of its most important military suppliers.
Although the EU has served as one of the main partners of both Israelis and Palestinians in the Oslo process and has been the key supporter of the Palestinian Authority ever since, it wasn’t able, for months after the October 7 attacks, to present a clear plan for the future of the Gaza Strip, not even regarding its own proposed contributions.
While EU interests in the Middle East are often driven by “realpolitik,” such as economic interests or the prevention of migration, there are several other interests at stake in the region for the EU in connection with its role in Israel and Palestine. Providing and maintaining security in its own neighborhood and preventing a major escalation of the current crisis is an obvious key interest. Its aspirations and responsibilities toward a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also form part of this perspective. This also determines the EU’s capacity as an influential “soft power” actor in the field of conflict resolution and democracy, which should require it to avoid blatant double standards with respect to international norms and laws. With regard to these goals, the recent EU approach to the war on Gaza has been extremely damaging. It is high time for the EU to explore policy options if it wants to regain lost credibility and shape future developments in the region.
Regarding the current conflict, the EU needs to prioritize a lasting ceasefire from the outset, coupled with a well-defined political horizon, the return of Israeli hostages to their families, the rehabilitation of Gaza’s deeply traumatized civilian population, and the end of the blockade in Gaza. As Israel’s most important trade partner, the EU possesses the necessary leverage in order to shape or at least contribute to shaping further developments. Instead, it has largely echoed American policy without actively influencing it.
Given prior EU involvement and missions such as EUBAM (the border assistance mission in Rafah) or EUPOL COPPS (the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support), the EU should explore possibilities for concrete contributions, specifically to guarantee the end of the long-standing Israeli blockade and a permanent opening of the Gaza Strip. This would be a precondition for any realistic perspective for a real future “reconstruction” effort, starting with the clearing of unprecedented masses of rubble and ensuring the entry of sufficient humanitarian aid, laying the foundation for economic revival. Politically, the EU, as a continuous supporter of the Palestinian Authority, should spell out what the nebulously coined “revitalization” of the PA could entail: rather than focusing on long-term institutional reform, it needs to help create a realistic and legitimate path forward in line with Palestinian aspirations.
The EU should end the double standards it has applied in the recent crisis if it still wants to be seen as a credible international actor. Several EU member states have agreed to arms exports to Israel despite serious allegations of human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Arms exports to Israel should be scrutinized by the same considerations as exports to other countries and regions, namely the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)—a position also expressed by the EU’s high representative on various occasions.[16] The EU should also welcome and support, rather than obstruct, attempts toward greater transparency and accountability, even if they are directed at allies. The various recent investigations and proceedings at the ICJ and ICC, respectively, can be important steps toward this goal, and the EU should wholeheartedly embrace their investigations and decisions.
The EU’s tendency to curb funding for Palestinian civil society organizations, often following smear campaigns without sufficient—or any—evidence, is counterproductive. It undermines the mutual trust built over decades and severely harms human rights organizations that already operate in a challenging environment. Prominent human rights organizations such as the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) or Addameer, which document violations and explore avenues for greater accountability and compensation for victims, should receive more support than ever.
Finally, the EU has always supported the two-state solution; a solution that the current government of Israel and Netanyahu personally have categorically rejected. Therefore, the EU needs to take concrete steps to make continuous Israeli occupation and the embedded systematic human rights violations more costly. If the EU advocates for the two-state solution, it must adjust its own actions and take concrete steps. This may be more important than scheduling new peace conferences with potentially lofty outcomes.[17] The EU needs to differentiate[18] between Israel and the illegal settlements and end its own de facto contribution to the settlements enterprise. Visa bans for violent settlers, as adopted by the US, France, Belgium, and Spain, are another example of small but concrete steps. However, the EU also needs to address the larger picture and take a clear position on the recognition of Palestinian statehood. A two-state solution that cannot even recognize the right of self-determination for both peoples is hardly credible and does not provide a basis to reopen a political horizon, as difficult as it will be after the events since October 7.
[1] Al Jazeera. “Israel Revises down Toll from October 7 Attack to ‘around 1,200.’” Al Jazeera, November 10, 2023.
[2] “Statement by President von der Leyen with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu,” Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, October 13, 2023.
[3] Policy statement by Olaf Scholz, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and member of the German Bundestag, on the situation in Israel, October 12, 2023. The “raison d’état” definition became common after his predecessor, Angela Merkel, used it in a speech before the Knesset in 2008. It is controversially debated. For a good overview, see Antje Wiener, “Staatsräson: Empty Signifier or Meaningful Norm? A Fundamental Norm with Unknown Meaning,” published on verfassungsblog.de, January 12, 2024.
[4] For the entire quote translated from Hebrew, see.
[5] German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock at the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations on February 2, 2024.
[6] European Commission, press release, October 9, 2023.
[7] “The Commission Finalises the Review of EU Aid to Palestine,” November 21, 2023.
[8] “Claims Versus Facts”, UNRWA, last accessed March 15, 2024.
[9] “Press Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell after His Meeting with Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Mohammad Shtayyeh,” November 17, 2023.
[10] Jeremy Sharon, “Pointing to Hamas’s ‘Little State,’ Netanyahu Touts His Role Blocking 2-State Solution,” Times of Israel, December 17, 2023.
[11] Evan Hill et al., “Israel Has Waged One of This Century’s Most Destructive Wars in Gaza,” Washington Post, December 23, 2023.
[12] “European Parliament Resolution of 18 January 2024 on the Humanitarian Situation in Gaza, the Need to Reach a Ceasefire and the Risks of Regional Escalation.”
[13] “Statement by 26 EU Foreign Ministers on Rafah,” February 21, 2024.
[14] Katya Adler, Toby Luckhurst, “Macron Calls on Israel to Stop Killing Gaza’s Women and Babies,” BBC, November 11, 2023.
[15] Jorge Liboreiro, “Spain and Ireland Call for ‘Urgent Review’ of EU-Israel Agreement over War in Gaza,” Euronews, February 14, 2024. Regarding the various camps, cf. Marzin Konečný, “The EU’s Response to the Gaza War Is a Tale of Contradiction and Division,” Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Winter 2024.
[16] After a meeting of development ministers in Brussels in mid-February, Borrell said: “Well, if you believe that too many people are being killed, maybe you should provide less arms in order to prevent so many people being killed.” See Andrew Gray, “EU’s Borrell suggests US cut military aid to Israel,” Reuters, February 13, 2024.
[17] As announced by Josep Borrell. Cf. Maria Psara, “Revealed: Josep Borrell’s 10-Point Peace Roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Euronews.
[18] For an overview, see European Council on Foreign Relations, Differentiation Tracker, last accessed March 15, 2024.