There is no single or unified Lebanese standpoint regarding the events in Palestine. There is nothing new here since the matter is linked to the traditional nature of intra-Lebanese conflicts and divisions which often reflect themselves when facing and dealing with major files and strategic options. This is when the attitudes of the various political parties begin to diverge and at times do not agree with the official position of the Lebanese state.
Lebanon’s foreign policy has for long been one of the most contentious of issues, given the background of a historical disagreement as to Lebanon’s role in the region and its stand vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, and whether Lebanon is a state that “aids and supports” or one of “confrontation.”[1] This debate is ongoing and has not been resolved in a manner satisfactory to all political parties which can subsequently be adopted as the official policy of the Lebanese state.
While the link between foreign and defense policies is organic in almost all states, it acquires additional importance in Lebanon due to its particular make-up and where some Lebanese political parties carry arms (i.e. Hizbollah) outside the state’s official framework with the aim of defending Lebanon and protecting its southern regions from unceasing Israeli onslaughts and violations lasting decades. These violations continued unabated even after most Lebanese territories had been liberated in 2000.
The Tufan al-Aqsa operation renews internal divisions
The Tufan al-Aqsa operation launched by HAMAS against Israeli settlements in the “Gaza Envelope” on October 7, 2023, raised fears that Lebanon might be plunged into the conflict. With every war launched by Israel against the Gaza Strip, all eyes turn to southern Lebanon, the front most affected by events in occupied Palestine.
As the early hours following that operation evoked popular reactions that welcomed it, especially among the community that hosts and supports resistance, official and party standpoints started to emerge when Israel declared its genocidal war on the Gaza Strip once it became clear that this was a war unlike previous wars and events were unfolding that seriously threatened the whole region. The very next day following the Tufan al-Aqsa operation Hezbollah announced “it had attacked three Israeli posts in the region of the occupied Lebanese Shib`a farms” explaining that this attack “aimed at liberating what remains occupied of our Lebanese territory, and in solidarity with the triumphant Palestinian resistance and the struggling and long suffering Palestinian people.”[2]
Official statements and standpoints
Lebanon’s official standpoints were expressed through declarations and statements made by the offices of the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, given the absence of any presidential standpoint due to failure to elect a new president until this present time of writing. Ever since the end of the mandate of the previous president General Michel Aoun on October 31, 2022, Lebanon has entered a long period of time where there has been no president. Parliament, with its major blocs of deputies and diverse smaller groups of independents and “reformers” have been unable to elect a successor due to divergent political and constitutional opinions to do with the right of deputies to “stealthily undermine” the legal quorum at a session to elect the president, that quorum being a majority of 86 votes out of a total of 128.
According to the constitution, presidential powers are transferred to the Council of Ministers collectively which the Council performs in lieu of the president in line with certain understandings and principles which allow for running the country’s affairs but without affecting the powers of an absent president. This lasts until a successor is elected once political consensus is achieved or when some foreign settlement by powers with influence on the Lebanese scene is arrived at. This would soon reflect itself on constitutional institutions as was the case on numerous past occasions.
It so happened that the government headed by Najib Miqati did not from the beginning possess full powers, having become a government that transacts current business only as of May 20, 2022, due to the ending of the mandate of the previous parliament and the beginning of the term of the newly elected parliament. Under normal circumstances, a government that transacts current business only is not expected to act in any manner that transcends a narrow definition of “transacting current business”. How, then, can it act in the absence of a president of the republic?
However, Israel’s war on Gaza and the opening of a warfront in southern Lebanon drove Prime Minister Miqati and Foreign Minister `Abdullah Buhabib to exercise their responsibilities as demanded by these new developments. They thus led a political and diplomatic campaign to keep Lebanon neutral and calling for the war to end. Miqati emphasized in his statements that “the government’s priority is to preserve security and stability in southern Lebanon, peace along the Blue Line, adherence to UN Council Resolution 1701, an end to persistent Israeli violations by air, sea and land, of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories that remain occupied.”[3]
For his part, the Foreign Minister after having met diplomats from 26 states declared: “We in Lebanon are not war mongers or war enthusiasts but seek to preserve calm and stability. All mounting Israeli provocations and assaults on our southern frontier should cease, together with the deliberate targeting of journalists, civilians, Lebanese army outposts, UNIFIL posts and the shelling of villages and towns with civilian populations.”[4]
The Speaker of parliament, Nabih Birri, stated his position in a speech at an emergency conference held in Algeria at the level of parliament speakers of the union of member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. He called on member states which had concluded agreements with the Zionist entity to rescind these agreements at once and asserted that “the task of defending Gaza and Palestinian is not the responsibility of a particular Palestinian group or party but that of the entire [Islamic] nation.” He further drew attention to the threat of the “transfer” campaign that the Israeli entity plans to carry through against the entire Palestinian people, and affirmed the right of the Palestinians to pursue their legitimate struggle with all means available to them.[5]
Western political and diplomatic moves towards Lebanon
Following the start of war, western political and diplomatic moves towards Lebanon became active. Lebanese officials received many foreign and Arab foreign ministers, notably the foreign ministers of the UK, France, Spain, Turkey, Iran and Hungary, in addition to US special envoy Amos Hochstein who had previously arranged indirect talks between Lebanon and Israel to complete the drawing up of the sea frontiers between them. It was noticed that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has not visited Beirut even though he has visited Israel and the region more than five times following the Tufan Al-Aqsa operation and the start of Israel’s war on Gaza.
Most foreign visitors stressed the need for the war not to spread to Lebanon thus leading to that war spreading throughout the region and emphasized the need for Lebanon to observe adherence to Resolution 1701. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated: “We are doing all we can to make sure the war does not spread to other countries, and we are also opposed to any harm coming to Lebanon and other countries due to this crisis. We agree with Lebanon regarding the need to preserve stability in these countries.”[6] Former French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna declared while in Beirut: “One must avoid miscalculations and strive to keep southern Lebanon free from turbulence since the current conflict might last an unspecified time.”[7]
However, the most active moves were those made by the US as expressed by Hochstein who on more than one occasion spoke about “the need to calm the situation in south Lebanon, even if it is not possible at present to arrive at a permanent settlement.” He further called for “working to achieve an interim solution to prevent a worsening of the situation.”[8] The striking thing about declarations by US and French officials was the pressure they applied to Lebanon to adhere to its commitments without simultaneously applying equal pressure on Israel, and warning of the dire consequences of neglecting adherence. What Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Buhabib related from his French counterpart when visiting Beirut follows that same theme. Buhabib stated: “French Foreigner Minister Stéphane Séjourné…warned Lebanese officials that Israel might launch a war against Lebanon in order to bring back tens of thousands of its citizens to the border region.”[9]
Among the various political proposals received by Beirut to stop the war and restore calm to the Lebanese south was the “French Paper”. Although it was not officially announced, several Lebanese newspapers revealed some of its contents. The Paper itself is headed “Security Arrangements between Lebanon and Israel.” In its first part, it alludes to the April 1996 understanding and proposes “a mechanism for a series of steps to be taken to achieve de-escalation within a graduated course running in stages when calm is achieved in Gaza, provided the sides adhere to a serious resolve to cease firing and when circumstances allow, to achieve effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which remains the basis of stability along the frontier.”
There are indications that this Paper calls for “the formation of an observer group made up of observers from the US, France, Lebanon and Israel to monitor the implementation of the security arrangements to be agreed upon and to deal with complaints submitted by any of the parties.” According to the Paper, implementation is in three stages. The first stage has no time limit and deals with stopping military operations on both sides of the frontier with detailed explanations of a special role for UNIFIL as per the basic provisions of Resolution 1701. The second stage, lasting three days, aims at “dismantling Hezbollah’s military posts and withdrawal of fighters and their missile and military arsenal to a distance of 10 km north of the Blue Line… in return, Israel agrees to suspend all flights over Lebanon.” This stage is accompanied by the deployment of 15 thousand Lebanese army soldiers in every area south of the Litani river, and coordination of all this activity is carried out following resumption of tripartite meetings in al-Naqura.”
The third stage, supposedly “to be accomplished within ten days” stipulates the start of negotiations “aimed at drawing up the land borders in accordance with resolution 1701 and joining in negotiations regarding a road map to guarantee the creation of a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani river where there is no armed presence, military posts or military hardware except those belonging to the Lebanese government or to UNIFIL.” The Paper also refers to “providing aid to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese army and economic aid to the region of southern Lebanon.”[10]
Lebanese Foreign Minister Buhabib stated: “Most important for Lebanon is to stop current clashes” and added, “We do not want half-way solutions which evaporate in a few months, and we intend to discuss all problems such as the Shib`a farms, the hills of Kfar Shuba, al-Ghajar, and on to determining the issue of the Blue Line which for us is a line of retreat whereas Israel considers it to be a frontier line.”[11]
The official Lebanese position has been to bank on the ending of Israel’s war on Gaza as a start for restoring stability to the Lebanese south, in light of Hezoballah’s declared position of unwillingness to stop its actions as long as the onslaught on Gaza persists, and in light of the unwillingness to engage in internal confrontation with Hezbollah to get it to abandon the link between the two warfronts and so expose Lebanon to an all-out Israeli war. Israeli politicians and military officials have not stopped threatening such a war and the latest threat came from Prime Minister Netanyahu who stated: “We have a simple objective in the north (i.e. the frontier with Lebanon) which is the return of its population.” While speaking with Israeli soldiers in the Mount Hermon region, close to the Lebanese border, he added: “To achieve that objective, we must restore security, and this will happen. We shall not be remiss in doing so and will achieve our aim in one of two ways, either militarily if necessary, or diplomatically if possible.”[12]
Lebanese government officials have tried hard to avoid the expansion of the war and plunging Lebanon into a severe military conflict. Adherence to Resolution 1701 and the attempt to get Israel to adhere to it are the chief points raised during political and diplomatic contacts in view of the rejection of “half-way solutions” as repeatedly expressed by the Lebanese Foreign Minister. Commenting on the request made by some western states that Hezbollah should retreat ten kilometers to the north of the Litani river, he stated: “This is a proposal that Lebanon rejects because it will not accept half-way solutions that neither bring about the peace desired nor ensure stability but will result in the renewal of war again and again. This is why we insist on full implementation of Resolution 1701 and believe that this is the right time to do so.”[13]
The positions adopted by Lebanese forces and parties
While Lebanese officials use the language of diplomacy to express the position of the Lebanese state, the matter was otherwise with non-official positions. Internal dissensions began on the first day of war pitting those who were opposed to forcing Lebanon into the war at a time when the Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian frontiers remained totally calm, versus others who argued that commitment to the Palestine cause demands breaking the silence and joining the resistance, especially since there still remained Lebanese territory under Israeli occupation, that is, the Shib`a farms and the hills of Kfar Shuba, which renders resistance legitimate.
The various positions became more extreme as Israel’s verbal threats to wage war on Lebanon grew sharper, threatening Lebanon with a fate no different from Gaza’s. Here, one should note that there is a Lebanese consensus for rejecting war but with diverse interpretations and views. The opposition considered that Hezbollah was dragging Lebanon into war and giving the Israelis a pretext to invade Lebanon. This is a view which accords with the demand that Lebanon should be neutral and separate itself from regional conflicts. For Hezbollah and its allies, there is one viewpoint which states that Hezbollah does not seek or want a war. However, if Israel persists in violating Resolution 1701, war is forced upon the Lebanese.
Between the one group and the other, some political parties adopted a median position. They rejected Israel’s assaults, did not condemn Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict but asked Hezbollah to avoid expanding the fighting, thus giving Israel the chance to attack Lebanon. This median position was led by former president of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Joumblatt. On the one hand, Joumblatt maintained his traditional policy of support for the Palestinian people, especially during the current onslaught on Gaza, while on the other hand he hoped that Lebanon would not be gradually lured into war, arguing that “the situation would be worse by far than the one we experienced during the siege and occupation of Beirut [in 1982]. We therefore call for national solidarity and a unified voice and policy.”[14]
Perhaps the most violent position opposing resistance and war was expressed by the presidents of the Lebanese Forces and of the Kata’ib Party, respectively Samir Ja`ja` and Sami al-Jumayyil. These two demanded that Hezbollah should cease to intervene in the war. The first stated: “Placing Lebanon at gunpoint will not benefit the Palestine cause but will bring total destruction upon our head. Accordingly, the real question is: Will the Lebanese government meet to decide to effectively implement Resolution 1701 and restrict military deployment in the south to the Lebanese army with support from UNIFIL?”[15] The second stated: “Where did this assumption arise that Hezbollah is stronger than the army? I have full confidence in the army, and the international support for the army is the most important weapon in the face of Israel.”[16]
The head of the Free National Movement Jubran Basil, who considered that what Israel was doing was a genocide of Gaza’s Palestinian population, when asked if he thought war was likely in Lebanon, responded: “Israel never lacked a pretext in the past to attack us.” However, he added that what concerned the Lebanese these days was to maintain Lebanon’s neutrality and that he preferred self defense to attack, pointing out that Iran, Hezbollah, and the US did not want an expansion of the war.[17]
Noteworthy in this regard was a statement made by former president General Michel Aoun (president from 2016 to 2022) who said during an interview on OTV station, which reflects the view of the Free National Movement: “We are not tied to Gaza with a defense treaty and the government is unable to adopt a standpoint. Victory should belong to the country as a whole and not to a segment thereof.” He added: “To say that to join the war is to preempt an Israeli assault on Lebanon is a matter of opinion, and entering the conflict might not avert danger but in fact might increase it.”[18]
One must also point out in this regard that the political understanding that was reached between Hezbollah and the Free National Movement, a major Christian party, in February 2006, has for some time been diminishing in force and effect to the point where a considerable number in that Movement and its supporters no longer consider themselves bound by that understanding which they believe can no longer be sustained.
Internal divisions reflect external standpoints
In sum, one must admit that domestic divisions regarding diverse issues reflect regional and international standpoints towards Lebanon. This becomes obvious during the many visits to Lebanon by various foreign officials since the start of the Gaza war. While everyone is concerned about the spread of war, yet every side has its own interests and views.
Though the interests of foreign powers continue to exercise their influence on the Lebanese scene, the dangers of the current situation in a region about to experience fateful but still unclear transformations awaiting the results of the battle. This calls for a more responsible and serious standpoint to be adopted on the domestic level before it is too late.
There is no doubt that rearranging domestic affairs and revitalizing constitutional structures constitute a principal starting point to limit the great political handicap suffered by the country due to the presidential void. This in turn requires new orientations derived from the provisions of the Lebanese constitution and other traditional principles and regulations. The war now raging in southern Lebanon and in northern occupied Palestine, while grave and momentous, is not the sole challenge faced by Lebanon at this critical stage. The aftereffects of the economic and social collapse are not yet behind us and the files that have piled up on the security, judiciary and political levels are still very numerous.
[1] سليمان الفرزلي، "حزب غزة: لبنان المساندة ولبنان المواجهة"، 10/1/2024، "أسواق العرب".
[2] "بيان صادر عن المقاومة الإسلامية في لبنان"، انظر.
[3] "ميقاتي تابع الوضع جنوباً وبحث مع زوار السرايا في التطورات: حرص على إبقاء لبنان بمنأى عن تداعيات الوضع في الأراضي الفلسطينية وحمايته"، "الوكالة الوطنية للإعلام"، 9/10/2023.
[4] "بو حبيب التقى سفراء 26 دولة: لسنا هواة أو دعاة حرب"، موقع Lebnanon24.com.
[5] "الرئيس بري: الدفاع عن غزة وعن فلسطين مسؤولية الأمة جمعاء ومخطط الترانسفير هو سقوط للأمن القومي العربي والإسلامي"، موقع "المنار"، 16/10/2023.
[6] "وزير الخارجية التركي من بيروت: نعمل لمنع توسع الحرب وعدم تضرر لبنان"، جريدة "المدن"، 17/10/2023.
[7] "وزيرة خارجية فرنسا في لبنان... محالوة لإبعاد ʾحزب اللهʿ عن الصراع"، جريدة "المدن"، 17/10/2023.
[8] "هوكشتاين يدعو إلى حل وسط لتجنب التصعيد في لبنان"، "سكاي نيوز عربية"، 11/1/2024.
[9] "وزير خارجية فرنسا يحذر لبنان من حرب قد تشنها إسرائيل"، "سكاي نيوز عربية"، 6/2/2024.
[10] "تفاصيل رد لبنان على ورقة ʾالترتيبات الأمنيةʿ"، جريدة "الأخبار"، 14/2/2024.
[11] "بو حبيب: الرد الأنسب على الورقة الفرنسية قيد البحث"، "نداء الوطن"، 26/2/2024.
[12] "نتنياهو يهدد مجدداً بعمل عسكري لإعادة الأمن إلى الحدود مع لبنان"، وكالة الأناضول، 23/2/2024.
[13] "بو حبيب لـʾنداء الوطنʿ: أنصاف الحلول لا تنفع ولن نقبل بها"، "نداء الوطن"، 6/2/2024.
[14] "جنبلاط: القرار هو استكمال حصار غزة وتدميرها ونأمل عدم استدراج لبنان إلى الحرب"، صحيفة "رأي اليوم"، 19/11/2023.
[15] "جعجع: وضع لبنان في فوهة المدفع لن يفيد القضية الفلسطينية بل سيجر علينا الدمار الشامل"، الوكالة الوطنية للإعلام، 11/11/2023.
[16] "الجميّل: لا نرفض الشراكة ولكن نرفض سياسة حزب الله الانقلابية ولي كامل الثقة بالجيش والدعم الدولي له أهم وأقوى سلاح"، الوكالة الوطنية للإعلام، 6/2/2024.
[17] "باسيل: لا نريد جر لبنان إلى الحرب ولكن نرفض جره إلى الهزيمة"، الوكالة الوطنية للإعلام، 30/10/2023.
[18] "عون يستكمل ʾالشقاقʿ مع ʾحزب اللهʿ: لسنا مرتبطين بمعاهدة دفاع مع غزة"، "الشرق الأوسط"، 20/2/2024.