The repercussions in Cairo of the storm unleashed on October 7 may be compared to a “black swan”, i.e. a sudden event which engenders drastic change and for which the Egyptian government may not have adequately planned its response, given an economic crisis that deeply affected societal structures and pressed heavily upon state institutions.
Cairo had to adapt itself to a geostrategic event of enormous complexity. On the one hand Cairo is bound by a peace accord and strong security relations with Israel. Throughout the past decade, this has allowed for modifications to be made to certain articles of that accord, e.g. permitting the Egyptian army to move with greater freedom when confronting the Wilayat Sina’ (The Sinai Province) movement. That extensive tactical cooperation to fight terror was in turn tied to the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington, which did not preclude strong economic ties with Moscow, despite the crisis in the Ukraine.
By contrast, Egypt’s security services are intimately linked to the HAMAS movement, and assumes the shape of a security cooperation since 2017, with a straight line to the rejection front. Thus, Egypt held secret negotiations with Tehran and reduced the chill with the Syrian regime. But the strange thing in all these relations is that they are accompanied by a permanent lack of trust among the parties concerned. Cairo understands the nature of the extreme right government in Israel while HAMAS is still counted as an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.
On the popular level, Palestine is at the forefront of concerns for Egyptians and, in light of the critical economic situation, it is no longer possible to defy the popular sentiment of solidarity with the Palestinians and the deeply felt hostility towards Israel. This is so because the revolutionary groups which helped to put an end to the Mubarak regime were all of them born in the womb of the second Palestinian Intifada.
Accordingly, Cairo was forced to act in many arenas in tandem in order to respond to the changes taking place and in accordance with a plan based upon the following:
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Restraining Israeli brutality.
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Responding to the absence of security in the Gaza Strip.
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Regrouping and reunifying the Egyptian street.
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Restraining Israeli brutality
Relations between Egypt and Israel are based upon pragmatic measures that often appear in conflict but proceed in tandem with the principle of reciprocity of feelings. This allows for the creation of a model, used successfully by Egypt, to contain Zionist military brutality as well as the reactions of an extreme right government in scattered incidents where Israelis were killed, whether involving soldiers on the frontier or tourists in Egypt. Likewise, commercial cooperation proceeds afoot between the two sides but this has not prevented Israel from exporting its crisis to Cairo or pushing Gaza’s inhabitants into Sinai, with all the challenges that these moves imply for the Egyptian regime.
Cairo was alert from an early moment to Israeli intentions to push the situation in an extremely dangerous direction, while at the same time subjecting the Rafah crossing to intense and repeated bombardment. In response to this, the matter was handled at two levels. The first level was horizontal with Egypt delivering very firm messages to Israel and the international community indicating that Cairo would not tolerate this because solving the question thus would mean exporting the crisis to Egypt. This, as can be foreseen, would mean a repeat of what happened during Black September 1970, since any resistance movement would necessarily strive to subject the territory it holds to its own conditions. At the same time, Israel would find a pretext to sweep through Sinai from time to time, alleging pursuit of resistance or other scenarios that constitute a dangerous threat to Egypt’s national security. Egypt made it very clear that it would not act as a refuge for Palestinians and Sisi called it a “red line.” He further stated that the Egyptian frontier will not be open to a mass Palestinian exodus.[1]
The other level of action was vertical. This involved stirring up mass sentiment in what resembled an excavation of collective memory, and moving diverse social forces by organizing demonstrations of millions of people throughout the country. This was intended, not merely to declare solidarity with Palestine but to voice warnings of a popular nature, imbued with anti-Israel sentiment, in a mass outpouring that was intended perhaps to remind others of the existence of a massive population group capable of sustaining human losses in any possible military conflict, no matter how prolonged.
As plans of forcible eviction receded, and three months after the start of the brutal war on Gaza, Israel declared its intention to take over the Philadelphia crossing point, a narrow strip of land 8.7 miles long, which stretches along the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Israel’s pretext was that closing that southern gap would prevent HAMAS from rearming after the war’s end. Statements made by Netanyahu indicate that Israel intends to control all entry points into the Gaza Strip. At a press conference from military HQ in Tel Aviv he declared: “It is clear that we will not end the war without ensuring that this gap is closed.”[2]
In response, Cairo openly rejected any intention to accommodate Israel’s plan to control that axis and commenced taking new security measures on the Egyptian side of the border in order to alleviate pressure and nullify Tel Aviv’s claims. According to the Wall Street Journal, Cairo informed Washington that any military operation launched by Israel to recover that sector would constitute a breach of the peace treaty signed by the two parties.[3] It thus appears that Cairo fears that Tel Aviv would begin to create a deeper demilitarized zone in Sinai, as a prelude to control the Rafah crossing. This latter has given Egypt a strategic advantage in the Arab Israeli conflict.
It is possible that Israel wishes to encourage Cairo and push it towards assuming a larger role in managing the Gaza Strip in the post war period, especially since Cairo, according to the Wall Street Journal, had rejected an American request delivered by CIA Director William Burns to President Sisi on November 7. That request was for Egypt to oversee security in Gaza following the war.[4]
It may be that this conclusion accords with the suggestion made by Haim Koren, former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, that a multinational force be created, led by the US, with Egyptian, Saudi and Emirati participation as well as representatives of the Palestinian Authority, to be in control of the Philadelphia crossing following the war.[5]
Hence, it appears that Cairo, having successfully dealt with plans to expel Gaza’s population to Sinai, now attempts to maintain its role as mediator, a role where Doha acts as its competitor in a file that Cairo has monopolized for decades. But Cairo does not wish to be involved further especially since participation by an Egyptian security force in controlling the Gaza Strip is a matter fraught with danger, and risks clashes with the resistance movement, a matter unacceptable in all cases to the Egyptian people,
Accordingly, it is expected that Egypt will continue to maneuver and strive to enhance its standing as a mediator between HAMAS and Israel, while rejecting Israel’s control over the Philadelphia crossing and, instead, tightening its security measures along the frontier.
It is possible that Tel Aviv might obtain implicit Egyptian consent to create separation zones to the north and east of the Gaza Strip. Cairo might even propose creating a zone of separation along the length of the Philadelphia crossing from the other side in order to contain the security vacuum in the Strip, provided Tel Aviv succeeds in eliminating HAMAS, which latter has, in recent years, cooperated closely with Cairo over security issues.
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Responding to the absence of security in the Gaza Strip
Cairo fears that a security vacuum in the Gaza Strip would ensue if HAMAS is eliminated. It also appears that Turkish ambitions to participate in running the Gaza Strip causes annoyance to Egypt’s military leadership which has not yet gotten over Turkey’s military presence in Libya. Cairo has hinted, possibly reluctantly, that it could participate in an American plan to form an Arab peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip after the war.
Furthermore, Cairo is not opposed to training security forces belonging to the Palestinian Authority to fill the vacuum in the Gaza Strip, even though it suspects that the popularity of that Authority in Gaza has plummeted, in addition to expected clashes occurring between that force and HAMAS elements and resultant Palestinian in-fighting which, for Cairo, primarily means chaos on its eastern frontier.
On the other hand, Cairo’s control over the Rafah crossing, Gaza’s sole exit point to the outside world, will require extensive efforts in view of the massive presence of refugees on the Palestinian side of the border and the need for further humanitarian aid, including the supply of water and electricity. But the greater crisis shall arise from Israel’s refusal to issue work permits to some twenty thousand Palestinian workers in Gaza after Israeli security reports had alleged that Gazan workers may have provided intelligence about kibbutz and military outposts to HAMAS prior to the war. At the same time, Israel’s construction sector is planning to import some one hundred thousand Indian workers into Israel.[6]
In this environment Cairo is trying to carefully manage the flow of aid into Gaza, thus slowing it down and leading to increased criticisms directed at Egypt, to the point of accusing it of besieging the Palestinians. However, Cairo believes that if any breach of procedures is allowed, this would result in loss of control over that crossing, with all the strategic dangers involved.
This naturally means pressure on Cairo from both within and without. Within, there exists a large popular bloc, with leftist movements at its core, who call for a more active role in aiding the Palestinians, accompanied by pressure from the Palestinian side that may duplicate the scenario of 2008, when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians stormed the frontier heading towards Sinai.
Cairo strives to coordinate with the Emirates which also needs to improve its image in the Arab world. Cooperation with Egypt saw the building of a water purification plant in Rafah.[7] Concurrently, Egypt is discussing with the Emirates and with Qatar a proposal of issuing work permits for Palestinian workers to work in newly created economic zones, to be funded by Gulf states near Rafah. There are certain reports that speak of US encouragement for this proposal, i.e. creating industrial zones for the manufacture of products made with Egyptian raw materials and with a Palestinian labor force, to be sold free of tax in the US and Europe.[8]
This proposal faces some practical obstacles, most notably the fact that it enshrines the idea of a semi-permanent Palestinian existence in Sinai which Israel might exploit to tighten the siege of Gaza with a view to driving more Palestinians to work in Egypt. Israel might also prevent these Palestinian workers from returning to Gaza any time it chooses. There is also the question of Egyptian workers among whom there exists a huge rate of unemployment and who might be in urgent need to find available work.
On the other hand, Cairo strives to test the waters with several parties in order to submit an initiative made up of three stages, beginning with a two-week, potentially expandable, ceasefire and leading to a national Palestinian dialogue whereby HAMAS might be incorporated into the PLO, thus avoiding the risk of a security vacuum in the Gaza Strip.
This Egyptian proposal, which has Qatar’s support, aims at a graduated halt to the war through a humanitarian truce, in return for the release of 30 to 40 hostages. Israel then releases 120 Palestinian prisoners. During that truce, all military activities would cease and heavy Israeli armor is removed from the Gaza Strip, while diverse aid is allowed to flow freely into the Strip.[9]
A HAMAS delegation headed by Isma`il Haniyya, recently arrived in Cairo, coinciding with reports of a rift inside the movement between the Sinwar wing, tied by several channels of communication to Cairo, and the Haniyya wing, now drawn closer to Doha and the resistance front led by Tehran.
Thus, `Izzat al-Rishq, member of the movement’s political bureau, has averred that there can be no negotiations without a complete cessation of the Israeli assault[10], something which Israel rejects outright. Furthermore, Israel has reservations regarding the Egyptian plan since it leaves HAMAS with some future role.
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Regrouping and reunifying the Egyptian street
The Tufan al-Aqsa operation took place at a time when Egypt is suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis and while on the eve of presidential elections. The choice made by the Egyptian regime was to adopt the discourse of support for the Palestinians and to try to restore some vitality to the popularity of President Sisi in the street through demanding a new mandate for him amidst these possible dangers. In other words, the regime strove to redirect popular anger towards enhancing Sisi’s popularity battered by the economic crisis and grown even poorer as Israeli gas imports declined alongside Houthi activities in the Red Sea.
Sisi announced his support of the Palestinians, affirming that his decision to do so was final, and asserting that he is at the forefront of those who support Palestine and work in its favor.
But it could be argued that playing the street card is a dangerous game, since total control is impossible. This is in fact what happened when revolutionary groups stormed through Tahrir Square, raising the standards of the January Revolution. This forced the government to restrict demonstrations but to continue to support the Palestine Question in the media. Overburdened with economic problems, the Egyptian street is nevertheless ready to offer further aid and sacrifices for the sake of Palestine. Hence, this crisis has demonstrated the depth of popular attachment to Palestine among Egyptians, and so the regime has attempted to harness that sentiment but without clashing with it, while also continuing to search for a political solution of the crisis to counteract the attempts by Israel to force through its security measures. In sum, prolongation of conflict will create further embarrassment for the Egyptian regime in the eyes of its people, an outcome the regime will try to avoid.
Conclusion
It could be argued that this crisis deeply affected the formative structures of strategic frameworks in the region, exerting its pressure on Cairo since day one. No sooner did Cairo recover from Zionist plans to terminate the question of Palestine and export the crisis to Egypt than signs of a new economic crisis began to loom as tourist figures and shipping in the Suez Canal declined as a result of Houthi activities in the south. Added to this is the forceful entry of Doha as a mediator between the parties to the conflict, a file that Cairo had monopolized for many years and during times of radical change. Cairo thus has attempted to maintain its mediating role while mobilizing all the means at its disposal, domestic and foreign, to confront Israeli plans on the one hand and regaining the popularity of the President on the other.
The crisis appears to be more violent than was expected, requiring diverse and non-conventional solutions in order to avoid the repercussions of a security vacuum in the Gaza Strip while confronting Israeli ambitions to achieve geostrategic gains on the ground. All this presents Cairo with novel burdens which require redefinition of all geostrategic options, the push to incorporate HAMAS into the PLO, prevent its destruction, and neutralize the Turkish side as much as possible. It also requires Cairo to formulate a number of new concepts regarding an active Egyptian role in running the Gaza Strip, but without getting involved in confrontation with the owners of the land, an issue of extreme complexity.
[1] Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “Israel’s endgame is to push Palestinians into Egypt – and the west is cheering it on”, The guardian, 20/10/2023.
[2] Keren Setton, “Israel aims to control Philadelphi Corridor in Gaza, challenging Egypt’s position”, The Jerusalem Post, 15/1/2024.
[3] Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israel Presses Egypt to Better Secure Borderland Against Hamas Smugglers”, The Wall Street Journal, 7/1/2024.
[4] Summer Said, “Egypt Opposes Helping Manage Security in Gaza After Hamas”, The Wall Street Journal, 11/11/2023.
[5] Keren Setton, op.cit.
[6] “INTERVIEW: India and Israel’s deepening ties and the implications for Southasia”, Himalmag South Asian, 14/1/2024.
[7] حسن خليل، "الإمارات تكسر الحصار المائي المفروض على قطاع غزة"، "حفريات"، 4/1/2024.
[8] Keren Setton, op.cit.
[9] "لوقف إطلاق نار دائم.. مقترحات مصرية على طاولة الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين"، "الحرة"، 24/12/2023.
[10] "حماس تجدد موقفها بشأن التفاوض مع إسرائيل، وتسعى لوقف العدوان بالكامل"، "الجزيرة"، 25/12/2023.