No sooner had the Islamic Movement HAMAS launched its military operation, entitled Tufan al-Aqsa, on October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip, leading to the death of hundreds of Israelis and the abduction of more than 200 prisoners than the question was raised as to the standpoint and role of Qatar. Several factors were instrumental in this regard, including the special relationship between Qatar and HAMAS which had come to dominate Gaza, since Qatar was hosting some political leaders of that movement and was contributing the major share of aid to Gaza. Another reason for raising that question was the attempt by western and Israeli media to find someone to blame since Qatar was seen as having contributed to the surprise October 7 attack.
However, investigations and the assigning of blame to Qatar remained to a large extent limited to certain media and to politicians who expressed personal opinions without being adopted as official policy by any state. By contrast, Doha from the very first moment assumed an “unapologetic” standpoint, announced very clear policies, and sought to put to use its earlier ties to the parties in conflict in order to continue to act as mediator or perhaps even to expand that role of mediation.
In the wake of the HAMAS operation and Israel’s war on Gaza, the issues relating to the State of Qatar included future relations between Qatar and HAMAS, the international view of this relationship, and Qatar’s own standpoint as regards Tufan al-Aqsa, Israel’s war, and the post-war period.
A month or so following the outbreak of war, Qatar firmed up its status as a mediator acceptable to all parties and a principal international player in everything happening in Gaza, but with clear points of difference between Doha and the US Administration, including Qatar’s consistent condemnation of Israeli policies. It is of course difficult to foresee what the Qatari role would be in the post-war period, or even in the next stage of the war, given the fact that many unpredictable factors are involved such as the course of the war itself and its results and the policies adopted by the other parties. However, one can analyze this role if one understands Qatari policy before and during the war and places this in the context of “managing” and “solving” the conflict. It would then be possible to also conceive “how each party to the conflict, especially the Palestinian and Israeli sides, might strive towards an arrangement whereby the Qatari role can further contribute to achieving the contradictory goals of each party.”
To understand the Qatari role, there are two principal considerations. There is to begin with Qatar’s foreign policy doctrine in general and specifically playing its mediating role in international conflicts, in particular through contact with non-state actors, specifically Islamic organizations and movements. Secondly, this has to do with understanding the scope and limits of Qatari policy towards the Palestine question in particular and how that policy interacts with the positions of the parties involved, especially the Israeli position. This last appears to be leaning towards a return to a policy of containment and pacification of the conflict or else of ending it decisively by exterminating the Palestinians. By contrast, the Palestinian position strives towards a political settlement that ensures the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on all lands occupied in 1967.
Qatar as an international mediator
Mediation is regarded as part of the foreign policy doctrine of Qatar. Qatar has striven to enhance its international standing through various measures which include mediation, as also expanding the role played by its Arab and international media. In recent years, mediations undertaken by Qatar included mediating between the US and the Afghan Taliban movement in 2020, between Rwanda and the Republic of the Congo in 2023, between Kenya and Somalia in 2021, between the warring parties in the Sudan in 2023, between the US and Iran in 2020, between Palestinian factions on numerous occasions, between Israel and HAMAS since at least 2014, in Lebanon in 2008, in Darfur in the Sudan in 2011, and in several other instances and countries.[1]
What helped Qatar to play this role was its active diplomacy, its vigorous media outlets, and its international relations and interests. It further benefited from its geographical location, its economic resources, and its special relationship with several international powers, including the US.[2]
In order to acquire influence and acceptance by the various sides, Qatar occasionally offers aid and support to some movements which might at first glance be regarded as setting Qatar against major international powers, such as maintaining relations with the Taliban when it was still fighting the US, hosting some Taliban leaders and permitting them to open an office in Doha since 2013.[3] But it became progressively clear that this policy was acceptable and was internationally coordinated.
Qatar’s Role in Gaza and with HAMAS
It is believed that the former Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, was the first Arab leader to visit Gaza after 1967, when the Palestinian leader Yasir `Arafat received him there in 1999. The Emir visited Gaza again in 2012, following the Israeli assault on the city that year. By then, Gaza was ruled by HAMAS and the Emir announced the granting of substantial aid for purposes of reconstruction.[4]
Qatar then began to host HAMAS leaders and house after they had been expelled from Jordan in 1999.[5] In the wake of the Syrian revolution of 2012 and following the rift between HAMAS and the Syrian regime and the exit from Syria of HAMAS leaders, the presence of HAMAS leaders in Qatar grew more visible and was encouraged by the US.[6] Eventually, Isma`il Haniyya, head of the movement, joined other HAMAS leaders resident in Qatar after he had left Gaza.
As HAMAS leaders settled in Qatar, international contacts with them commenced. Thus, for example, Musa Abu Marzuq, a HAMAS leader, revealed that in February 2015, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Gaza as representative of the international quartet (delegated to pursue the Palestine file and made up of the USA, the European Union, Russia and the UN) and met HAMAS leaders. He urged them to adopt a Palestinian political program based upon a Palestinian state with 1967 borders as a final settlement of the conflict with Israel and to ensure that HAMAS was a Palestinian movement with Palestinian goals and not part of an Islamist movement with regional ambitions.[7] From Gaza Blair moved on to Qatar where he met several times with the then head of HAMAS’s Political Bureau, Khalid Mish`al, with their discussions centering on earlier ideas alluded to by Abu Marzuq.[8] On May 1, 2017, HAMAS announced, from Doha, a new political program which approximated to these ideas, especially by declaring itself to be a Palestinian national movement and its acceptance of the two-state solution.[9]
Speaking to the press following his meeting with US Secretary Blinken on October 13, 2023, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Rahman Al Thani, and on the subject of opening a HAMAS Office in Doha, stated: “This Office will be used at first to act as a channel of communications and a means to bring peace to the region. This is the purpose behind it.”[10]
Qatar provided regular monthly financial aid to Gaza and for years contributed 30 million USD as relief to the Gazan poor, as wages of civilian employees appointed by HAMAS and as partial funding of the fuel needed to operate Gaza’s electrical stations. This was in addition to financing reconstruction in Gaza in the aftermath of several bouts of destruction by Israel, bringing Qatar’s total aid to Gaza under HAMAS to billions of USD.[11]
That aid was granted following coordination with the Israeli government and with Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu in particular, especially the monthly operation of delivering tens of millions of USD in suitcases carried by Qatari officials. Security was provided by Israel as they crossed Palestine’s land borders and Israeli checkpoints and airports before reaching Gaza. As Qatari officials declared that this aid was earmarked for humanitarian and civilian purposes, Netanyahu, as reported in detail by the New York Times, was hoping that he would thereby maintain calm in Gaza through an implicit deal with HAMAS, thus ensuring the impossibility of a two-state solution by keeping the Palestinians split between two weak regimes, one in Gaza, the other in the West Bank. The NY Times went on to explain that the matter did not relate simply to Qatari aid but to other financial resources and transactions of HAMAS, to the point of Israel forbidding Israeli Security officers from testifying in a case raised against a Chinese Bank by relatives of people killed during military operations carried out by HAMAS. Those relatives had accused the Bank of facilitating the transfer of funds to HAMAS.[12]
Qatari aid to Gaza has been analyzed from several points of view. That aid, implicitly acceptable to the Palestinian Authority as well, is regarded from one viewpoint as crucial in helping to prevent the elimination of the Palestine cause by helping to support Palestinian endurance and by keeping the Palestinians on their own land, frustrating Israel’s attempt to expel them.
Another viewpoint, or perhaps an US-Israel usage and explanation, holds that aid does help also to prevent violent conflict, limiting violent assault and resistance, and helping to contain HAMAS as Israel continues to expand its occupation of the West Bank and the rest of Palestine.
Qatar’s stand and role after October 7
Since October 7, Qatar’s declared standpoint has been one calling for calm but blames Israel for what happened. A Foreign Affairs Ministry release dated that day stated: “The State of Qatar expresses deep concern over events developing in Gaza and calls upon all sides to stop escalation, bring about calm and exercise maximum self-restraint.” It added: “The Foreign Ministry holds Israel solely responsible for the current escalation due to its continuing violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the latest being the repeated assaults on the Aqsa Mosque carried out under the protection of the Israeli police.”[13]
There followed a number of Qatar declarations reflecting a certain confidence and lack of anxiety as regards the possibility of holding Qatar responsible for what HAMAS had done, but without Doha ignoring the possibility that this might in fact happen. This is why, on October 13, the Qatari Prime Minister stated: “Qatar’s commitment to its role as a partner in the peace process and a mediator in disputes ought not to be exploited by attempts to vilify its reputation, attempts that past experiences have shown to be false and reveal the bad faith of those who traffic in them.”[14]
Answering a report carried by France 24 TV, headed: “Qatar, Iran, Turkey and others: the network of HAMAS allies” which stated that the relations of these powers with HAMAS has now become a “subject of investigation”, an official Qatari media release explained that “Qatar is not a financial backer of HAMAS. It extends aid to Gaza, and the target of its funding is very clear.” The Qatari response added that “Qatari aid is fully coordinated with Israel, the UN and the US. That aid includes 100 USD paid to the most destitute families in Gaza to cover basic food and medication needs and extend the electricity network…that aid is intended to maintain stability and benefits Palestinian families in Gaza.”[15]
In the context of war, Qatar’s most prominent role has been to act as mediator between Israel and the US on one side and HAMAS on the other, with the agreement, explicit or implicit, of all sides. Doha achieved along with Cairo a number of basic mediations. It looked as if Doha had quickly grasped the significance of that sudden event and had put in place a rapid policy of moving forward.
Merely a few hours after the Tufan al-Aqsa operation, Doha began to act as mediator in the prisoner exchange file, especially for the release of civilian Israeli female prisoners and prisoners with foreign, specially US, nationality. Sources in HAMAS declared to the media that this mediation took place with US backing.[16] The Qatari position sprang from grasping that a high state of tensions redoubled the need for negotiation and mediation, and the moment appeared to be opportune for moving forward rather than holding back.
Barely a week after October 7, US Secretary Blinken visited Doha. At a joint press conference with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Rahman Al Thani, the latter defined the role of his country as follows: “In Qatar, we firmly believe in mediation and dialogue. It is part and parcel of our foreign policy, and we have for long striven to keep all lines of communication open with all sides in all regions of conflict, thus contributing to enhancing our role as a dependable partner in peace-making.”[17]
At a press conference between the two officials on October 13, Qatar spelled out three urgent and major objectives: that the conflict should not spread to other fronts, that aid should be delivered to Gaza, and that prisoners should be released. The Qatari official expressed these objectives thus: “The role of the State of Qatar is to focus on finding solutions for this crisis and preventing its spread to other arenas of conflict. Its priorities today focus upon a ceasefire, delivering humanitarian aid and the return of prisoners to their homes.” These objectives were also shared by the Americans with Blinken affirming that “the US and Qatar have a shared objective in preventing the conflict from spreading. We held detailed discussions regarding our common effort to prevent any other actor, state or non-state, from creating a new battlefront,” and added: “We are working very closely together to secure the release of the hostages, including US citizens, held by HAMAS in Gaza.”
The US position was strongly in favor of destroying HAMAS and ending its existence in Gaza, thus echoing the Israeli position. Nevertheless, visits by US officials to Arab countries and discussions with Arab diplomats lessened somewhat the rigid US position in favor of discussing humanitarian pauses in the war and delivering aid.
In addition to the above three objectives (preventing the spread of war, prisoner exchange and delivery of aid) these being urgent and practicable objectives, Doha also spelled out the basic long-term objective. An official release stated: “The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirms that the sole guarantee to achieve lasting peace in the region is a just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestine Question, one that ensures restoration of their rights to the Palestinian people and the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with east Jerusalem as its capital.” In that regard, Qatar rejected any plans of expulsion from the Gaza Strip. Differences between the US and Qatar centered upon issues such as holding HAMAS solely responsible for what happened while rejecting the destruction of HAMAS, widening the scope of war in Gaza, and expulsion of its population.
Direct mediation and the release of hostages
Qatar’s “non-apologetic” tone as regards its role and relationship to HAMAS was accompanied by a Qatari initiative to reach out widely to contact diverse parties. Thus, on the second day of the operation, the Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and Palestinian president Mahmud `Abbas were in touch,[18] while these contacts included several Arab countries, even with those like the Emirates which had until recently severed all relations with Qatar.
Qatar’s role was widely welcomed on the Arab and international scene. Thus, at the Arab-Islamic Summit held in Riyad on November 12, 2023, it was decided to delegate the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, as chair of the current session of that Summit, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria and Palestine.[19] While one may understand the role of Jordan and Egypt by reason of their territorial contiguity with Palestine in addition to the Saudi and Egyptian role and its historic weight, and can further understand the selection of other major Muslim countries, the addition of Qatar to this delegation had to do with recognition of its political role, its relations and its mediation initiatives which by then were far advanced.
Qatar’s mediation, alongside Egypt’s, succeeded at first in releasing Israeli prisoners held by HAMAS when the latter, two weeks after the start of its operation (on October 20), released two American Israeli females, followed, on 23 October, by the release of two Israeli females.[20] On November 24, a temporary ceasefire was achieved when 81 Israeli prisoners (women and children) were released in return for the release of Palestinian women and children from Israeli jails, on the basis of three Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli prisoner. HAMAS further released 24 prisoners from foreign nationalities before the Israeli assault recommenced on December 1.[21]
That mediation effort determined the Israeli and subsequently the western position as regards the role of Qatar, despite Qatar’s standpoint which held Israel to be responsible for the war. Thus, the Israeli national security adviser Tzahi Hanegbi wrote in a tweet on X and as reported by the media: “I am happy to say that Qatar has become a principal party and partner in facilitating a humanitarian solution. Qatar’s diplomatic efforts are crucial at this time.”[22] Both US President Biden and UK Prime Minister Sunak thanked Qatar and its Emir Tamim ibn Hamad for their role in the release of hostages.[23]
CNN used the term “indispensable” in a report entitled “How did Qatar, a small Arab country, become indispensable in talks with HAMAS?”[24] The Wall Street Journal published another report entitled “Gazan diplomacy enhances Qatar’s role as a global mediator.”[25]
Qatari mediation efforts involved direct meetings with Israeli security officials. Doha hosted Israeli MOSSAD personnel and Qatari officials visited Israel, landing at Lydda airport (called Ben-Gurion by the Israelis). In Doha, and beginning at the end of November, Qatar’s Prime Minister received CIA Director William Burns and head of MOSSAD David Barnea several times to discuss issues of mediation, especially the question of prisoners and a temporary ceasefire. These meetings later continued in Europe and other places. At the end of November, the Associated Press reported that Qatari officials had landed at Lydd airport to follow through their mediation efforts.[26]
Public visits like those between Qatar and Israel, while occurring under exceptional circumstances, alongside earlier contacts, would have constituted an unusual regional and international event having to do with normalization had they occurred when there was no war, a matter which in any case the Israelis have been longing to achieve. By contrast, Lulwa al-Khatir, Qatari Minister for International Cooperation, was the first international government official to enter the Gaza Strip at the head of a Qatari delegation on November 26, on a mission lasting several days to deliver aid and to coordinate the removal of injured people for treatment in Qatar. This was one result of Qatari Israeli negotiations.[27] To be noted is the fact that Qatari mediation efforts were not confined to coordination of measures with Israel and the Palestinian resistance movement but also included Qatar’s role in facilitating humanitarian aid on the ground.
Qatar achieved several benefits from that process of mediation. First, it assured its place as a mediator acceptable to all parties. Thus, the Palestinian resistance is not opposed to Qatari Israeli contacts, and Israel thanked Qatar despite the latter’s pro-Palestinian stand and its hosting of HAMAS in Qatar. In addition, Qatar was able to arrange for a temporary ceasefire and a prisoner exchange and delivered aid to Gaza when Arab and other states declined to do so without prior agreement with Israel. For instance, in mid-January 2024, an agreement was announced between Israel and HAMAS, a result of a Qatari French mediation, which, in the words of Muhammad Majid al-Ansari, Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson, stated that “medicines and humanitarian aid would be delivered to the civilians of Gaza…in return for delivery of medicines needed by Israeli prisoners in the Gaza Strip.”[28]
While the efforts of Qatar centered on the situation in the Gaza Strip, the problem of preventing the conflict from escalating was another issue where Qatar could play a role. Qatar rejected the international alliance for security of shipping in the Red Sea that Washington tried to assemble, and openly condemned the military strikes launched by the US and the UK in January 2024, as a response to the actions taken by the Houthi group in Yemen against ships heading to Israel. At a joint press conference held by the Qatari Prime Minister and the US Secretary of State in Doha on January 7, 2024, the Qatari official stated: “We cannot ever regard military action as a solution,” and called for “a cessation of all that is happening to civilian shipping as soon as possible,
to be effected through diplomatic means.”[29] On that same subject Shaykh Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Rahman, speaking at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, argued that US and UK military strikes will not restrain Houthi attacks on shipping routes in the Red Sea without exerting diplomatic efforts.” In another release, Majid al-Ansari, Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson, affirmed that “escalation of tensions in the Red Sea is part and parcel of tensions in Gaza, and cannot be solved if we ignore the ending of the war on Gaza.”[30]
Conclusion: Qatari policy between ‘managing’ the conflict and ‘solving it’
Qatari moves depended to a large extent upon exploiting the urgent need of the Israeli US side to deal with the issue of Israeli prisoners and thus built upon this a process of negotiations, the most salient objectives of which was delivery of aid to Gaza and attempts to achieve a ceasefire. Were it not for the issue of the “hostages” and the mediation efforts to release them or even to deliver medicines to them, Doha’s ability to mediate would this time have been less effective than before.
Qatar’s Prime Minister summarized his country’s vision of the post war period by stating: “Our priority as we conceive it is first to end the war…Then, when war ends, to seek a solution for the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, two regions that cannot be separated from one another. The two regions must be treated as a single unit. As for Qatar’s support for the Palestinian people, this policy shall continue and not be affected by political circumstances. What we truly wish to see is a permanent settlement for the people of Palestine and granting them their state at the end of the day. That will be the only solution which will maintain and safeguard all our efforts and investments in the long run.”[31]
In practical terms there exist three principal schools of thought as regards dealing with the Israel Palestine conflict, and these overlap or else are used by the various sides but each occurring at diverse occasions and forums. First is to “manage” the conflict and stop it from escalating, keeping it free from violence but without seeking a political solution or settlement. This was Israel’s policy prior to the war of October 7 whereby governments headed by Bibi Netanyahu had agreed to many plans and measures intended to maintain Palestinian divisions and frustrate any real effort to effect a two-state solution. That policy permitted HAMAS to remain in Gaza and obtain foreign aid while Israeli settlements multiplied, and the West Bank was being swallowed up.
The various resistance factions in Gaza, in particular HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, accepted for a while the idea of managing and confining the conflict but for a reason other than Israel’s. Given the living and security conditions and the imbalance in power with Israel, and due to internal Palestinian divisions, these factions accepted a ceasefire but used it to fortify their military capabilities. HAMAS further attempted to tighten its hold on Gaza while striving also to put a final end to the siege. In other words, the “managing the conflict” school of thought was one whereby Israel tried to marginalize the Gaza Strip and keep it weak and under siege while expanding its settlements on the West Bank. HAMAS on the other hand adopted that school of thought for diverse reasons among which was the attempt to move Gaza beyond the state of siege, improve living conditions, and build up the capabilities of resistance to rectify the balance of power. Both schools of thought found the Qatari role to be of help. The October 7 operation was an attempt by the resistance to change the balance of power and force progress to a new stage where conditions for managing the conflict are changed or where a new political process might commence.
The second school of thought, calling for “settlement of the conflict” is the one which seeks to arrive at a political settlement based on negotiations. In effect, this “school of thought” now enjoys Palestinian, Arab and international consensus, but Israel’s opposition to it is backed by “blind” and material support for its international policies, especially in Washington and Europe, and these latter ignore Israel’s opposition to a political settlement as well as its daily assaults.
This school of thought, i.e. the path of negotiations, is the actual program of the Palestinian Authority. But what weakens the chances of this process, on top of Israeli rejection and US support for Israel, is the weakness of the Palestinian position itself due to failure to reinforce Palestinian institutions and the failure to reinvigorate them through holding elections or arriving at a national consensus. This has further tipped the balance of power in Israel’s favor.
The third school of thought, advocated especially by Israel, and accepted by the US, holds that it is possible to ignore, marginalize or postpone the Palestine question and that normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries would occur without settling the question of Palestine or paying it any attention.
If the crisis of the Israeli prisoners were to end in one manner or another and without a political process in place together with agreements as to the next stage, the chances that Israel would accept any mediation or any calls to calm would decrease, as also acceptance of Qatar’s role.
There are 3 possible scenarios for the future of Gaza which touch upon the role of Qatar:
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If Israel succeeds in decisively ending the conflict in Gaza, by expelling its inhabitants and ending resistance, it will refuse to admit any role to be played by any regional powers, including Qatar, with regards to the question of Palestine. Israel’s refusal to tolerate any regional role involving Palestine is very clear even in normalization negotiations with Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and others. Qatar’s role has been exceptional because of Doha’s ability to exert pressure on developments on the ground.
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If the policies of “managing the conflict” were to return, and the war ends without a clear result, opportunities will exist for regional interference, especially by Egypt and Jordan for geographical reasons, and by Qatar because of its relations with HAMAS and the other parties.
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In order to force through a “settlement of the conflict” through negotiations, which is the Palestinian, Arab and international position, the starting point should be to heal the divisions inside the Palestinian camp and present a unified political vision. This can occur through an initiative launched by Palestinian factions, especially the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. It can also occur through an effective process of Arab mediation, especially Egyptian, Jordanian and Qatari efforts. The Qatari role would involve closely working with the Palestinian side, and pressuring the US and the international community while cooperating with regional and international allies. Such a scenario would be the most beneficial not only to the Palestinians but to Arab states with direct ties to the Palestine question, such as Qatar, which will retain its role as an acceptable mediator and thus profit from its long term “investment” in the Palestine question.
[1] Patrick Wintour, “Why is Qatar often a mediator and what is its role in Israel-Hamas war?”, The Guardian, 21 November 2023.
Yoel Guzansky, “Qatar’s Balancing Act in Gaza”, Foreign Affairs, 5 January 2024.
Vassilis K. Fouskas, “Qatar and the Israel-Hamas conflict: Hybrid mediation power on display”, Open Access Government, 24 November 2023.
[2] Jennifer Jacobs and Annmarie Hordern, “Biden Officials Talking to Qatar About Supplying Gas to Europe”, Bloomberg, 22 January 2022.
[3] "من استضافة مكتب طالبان إلى تشغيل مطار كابل.. تعرف على الدور القطري في مسار الأحداث الأفغانية"، "الجزيرة"، 6/9/2021.
[4] "القضية الفلسطينية في صلب الحملة على قطر"، "الجزيرة"، 5/6/2017.
[5] المصدر نفسه.
[6] Guzansky, op. cit.
[7] "أبو مرزوق: ’بلير‘ وضع خمسة شروط لتحسين مستوى المعيشة بغزة وإعمارها"،"رؤيا"، 17/2/2015.
[8] David Hearst, “How Tony Blair courted Hamas leader with invite to London”, Middle East Eye, 19 November 2021.
[9] علي الجرباوي، "وثيقة ’حماس‘ الجديدة: نهاية المطاف أم بداية مسار جديد؟"، "مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية"، العدد 111(صيف 2017).
[10] "رئيس مجلس الوزراء وزير الخارجية يؤكد حرص قطر على خفض التصعيد في غزة وتجنيب المنطقة المزيد من العنف" (الدوحة: وزارة الخارجية)، 13/10/2023.
[11] “Qatar plans to resume Gaza funding with new mechanism”, AL JAZEERA, 6 September 2021.
[12] Mark Mazzetti and Ronen Bergman, “‘Buying Quiet’: Inside the Israeli Plan That Propped Up Hamas”, The New York Times, 10 December 2023.
[13] "قطر تعرب عن قلقها من تطورات الأوضاع في قطاع غزة وتدعو لوقف التصعيد والتهدئة" (الدوحة: وزارة الخارجية)، 7 تشرين أول/أكتوبر 2023.
[14] (الدوحة: وزارة الخارجية)، مصدر سبق ذكره.
[15] المصدر نفسه.
[16] “Qatar mediates urgent prisoner swap between Hamas, Israel”, Xinhua, 9 October 2023.
[17] (الدوحة: وزارة الخارجية)، مصدر سبق ذكره.
[18] "أمير قطر يبحث مع الرئيس الفلسطيني تطورات الأوضاع في غزة"، "الجزيرة"، 8/10/2023.
[19] عبد الرحمن الأسمري، "قمة الرياض: كسر حصار غزة.. وإدخال مساعدات إنسانية تشمل الموقود"، "الرياض"، 11/11/2023.
[20] Amy Spiro and Toi Staff, Two Israeli hostages, Nurit Cooper, 79, and Yocheved Lifshitz, 85, released from Gaza, The Times of Israel, 23 October 2023.
[21] Sammy Westfall and Helier Cheung, Here are the hostages released by Hamas and those remaining in Gaza, The Washington Post, 9 January 2024.
[22] Michael Bachner and Toi Staff, In rare praise, Israel hails Qatar’s ‘crucial’ diplomatic efforts in Gaza crisis, The Times of Israel, 25 October 2023.
[23] فرانك غاردنر، "كيف أصبحت قطر محور المحادثات حول الرهائن الإسرائيليين؟"، "عربي بي بي سي نيوز"، 28/10/2023.
[24] Nadeen Ebrahim, “How the tiny Arab state of Qatar became indispensable in talks with Hamas”, CNN, 2 November, 2023.
[25] Stephen Kalin, “Gaza Diplomacy Cemented Qatar’s Global Mediator Role”, The Wall Street Journal, 25 November 2023.
[26] CIA, Mossad chiefs meet in Qatar as Israel-Hamas truce is extended, AL JAZEERA, 28 November 2023.
Mossad team in Qatar to discuss restarting Gaza truce, source says, Reuters, 2 December 2023.
Isabel Debre, “Qatar is the go-to mediator in the Mideast war. Its unprecedented Tel Aviv trip saved a shaky truce”, Associated Press, 28 November 2023.
Mossad and Qatar Officials Meet as Israel Bombards Gaza, Voice of America, 16 December 2023.
[27] "أول زيارة رسمية من نوعها.. الوزيرة القطرية لولوة الخاطر في غزة"، "العربي"، 26/11/2023.
[28] "وساطة قطرية تنجح في التوصل لاتفاق بين إسرائيل وحماس على إدخال أدوية ومساعدات إلى غزة" (الدوحة: وزارة الخارجية)، 16/1/2024.
[29] “ Joint Press Availability: Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Qatari PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani”, “US Embassy in Qatar”, 7 January 2024.
[30] ياقوت دندشي، "قطر: لا حل للتوتر بالبحر الأحمر دون إنهاء الحرب على غزة"، وكالة أنباء "الأناضول"، 16/1/2024.
[31] “US Embassy in Qatar”, op. cit.