Discussions about the day after dominate today's international political and media debates. At first sight, these debates could be seen as a continuation of the routine practices of colonial administrations aimed at shaping their own interlocutors within the indigenous population. Yet, even as Israeli leaders present themselves as omnipotent, including in the narrative of what's to come, there is no indication that they will have the means to impose their views. The strategic impasse, the withdrawal of elite brigades and the daily increase in the number of Israeli soldiers killed by fighting forces in Gaza and on the northern front suggest otherwise.
Rather, the amplification of programmatic discourse on the post-war period should be seen as a symptom of weakness. Indeed, it is precisely around the future administration of the Gaza Strip that tensions within the Israeli establishment are crystallizing. While Prime Minister Netanyahu has cancelled a meeting on the subject, Finance Minister Smotrich is demanding that the matter be dealt with by the security cabinet, not the war cabinet. Tensions are also operating within the war cabinet itself: at the first meeting held on this subject on January 4, Yoav Galant asserted that Israel would play no role in the management of civil affairs, which would be entrusted to local Palestinian councils not hostile to Israel. These conflicts thus testify to a loss of control over the narrative at a time when the only space in which the Israeli authorities can still act in Gaza is whether or not to continue bombing civilians.
If the Gaza Strip occupies a major place in Palestinian political and social history, October 7 brought this centrality to light. Gaza first enabled Palestine to dominate the international diplomatic agenda, whereas this issue had been considered marginal or even buried since the Abraham Accords. Today, Hamas, having imposed itself by force of arms, enjoys such popular support that it seems impossible to exclude it from any search for a political solution. Finally, the ground incursion also showed that the logic of elimination, expulsion and occupation is not confined to the West Bank, but also concerns the Gaza Strip and its population, 80% of whom are 1948 refugees. This change of perspective thus invites us to reconsider entirely the episode of the Israeli withdrawal of 2005, which, long perceived as a long-term strategic design, now appears as a mere parenthesis.
Key players and their positions
Israel: Benjamin Netanyahu has formulated several objectives for the current military incursion. Initial speeches emphasized the need to destroy Hamas, eradicate it from power and bring back the hostages. Then other objectives were added: demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, creating buffer zones to the north and south of the coastal strip along the Philadelphia Corridor, and reducing the Gazan population by encouraging its "mass flight to Europe and African countries". The plan to expel the Gazans, disclosed in an intelligence document recommending expulsion to Sinai, enjoys a consensus among Israeli officials, as evidenced by the statements of the Ministers of Defense and Finance, which legally represent incitement to genocide. On the subject of the future governance of the territory, Netanyahu reiterated his refusal to grant this role to the Palestinian Authority, preferring to entrust it to a reformed transitional authority made up of Arab countries. This contradicts Galant's proposals that the Palestinians would be responsible for civil affairs, while a multinational force comprising the USA, European and Arab countries would be in charge of rebuilding the Gaza Strip, albeit under Israel's ultimate supervision.
Properly understood, these speeches should be seen in the context of Netanyahu's personal considerations as he stakes his political survival, and in the context of a power game pitting him against his political rivals. As he awaits trial, it is clear that in this war the Prime Minister is intertwining his political fate with that of the entire country. While Netanyahu has often attacked Gaza during election periods to impose himself as head of government, this attempt to play the confrontation card by responding disproportionately to the October 7 attack has backfired. The murderous headlong rush against Gazan civilians is thus not only an expression of his personal power, but also that of an ailing leadership that is tearing itself apart over the question of stopping the bombing. Benny Gantz is pressing for the transition to the low-intensity "third phase" that President Biden is calling for. Far from being more "moderate" than Netanyahu, Gantz distinguishes himself from the Prime Minister with the aim, like Yov Galant, of preparing a way out for the aftermath. In any case, the announcement on January 1 of the withdrawal of thousands of soldiers from northern Gaza, officially to close ranks, has not reduced the fighting but has, on the contrary, given rise to new massacres against civilians.
Hamas: Regardless of the hypothetical Israeli scenarios, Hamas remains firmly in place after three months of fighting. It seems unconcerned by the debates surrounding the Day After, except when it comes to pointing out that nothing will be done without Hamas: "Any arrangement in Gaza that excludes Hamas and the other resistance factions is an illusion and a mirage", Ismaël Haniyeh insisted three times. On the subject of the governance of the Gaza Strip, Hamas leaders said they were ready to form a technocratic government, thus reiterating an old position formulated during previous reconciliation agreements and according to which no official member of Hamas would therefore be part of this government. Moussa Abu Marzouq's recent statements also confirm that Hamas remains keen to integrate the PLO beyond the PA institutions.
From Gaza and Beirut, Hamas leaders have repeatedly stressed their willingness to make the return of Israeli hostages and prisoners conditional on a total ceasefire. In early December, Al-Arouri stated that "the official and definitive decision of Hamas: 'No release without a total halt to the military operation'. On January 1, this objective was accompanied by other demands, including total withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and guarantees on reconstruction. In his speech on January 2, Ismaël Haniyeh recalled that Hamas was as active in negotiations for a prisoner exchange (via Egyptian and Qatari mediation) as it was in internal discussions with the other Palestinian factions to set up a common program and see the emergence of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. A few hours later, following Arouri's assassination, he declared that he was suspending negotiations for a prisoner exchange, Arouri having himself enabled the first prisoner exchange to take place through Qatar.
The United States: is not a third party or a mere external supporter of Israel; October 7 brought to light the direct and full involvement of the United States alongside Israel, both in sending forces into the field and in transferring arms, including bypassing Congress. We should also note the unconditional support within the UN Security Council through the systematic use of the veto against ceasefire demands. Thus, the disagreements between Biden and Netanyahu over the future role of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, or the return to de facto occupation of the territory by Israeli forces, could be partly the result of staging.
Perceived as a blank check for the massacres perpetrated against the Palestinians, this total alignment with Israel is undermining President Biden and the entire Democratic camp, which is looking for a way out in Netanyahu's favor. However, such a way out could prove extremely costly for the Biden administration, which is accused of jeopardizing the entire country in order to protect its Middle Eastern ally. The price to pay could be the regional extension of the conflict that Biden fears. This is how the recent statements aimed at limiting the impact of the assassination of Saleh al- Arouri should be understood, by presenting him as a Palestinian figure whose assassination was part of a conflict between Israel and Hamas alone. The price for Biden would also be his re-election to the presidency, which is why, since mid-December, pressure has been mounting for Israel to stop the war as soon as possible. President Biden has described the Israeli bombardments as "indiscriminate", while on January 3, White House spokesman John Kirby declared that while Israel can hope to reduce Hamas's military capabilities, the Palestinian movement cannot be annihilated.
The Palestinian Authority: Accused of nepotism, security collaboration on behalf of Israel and torture of its opponents, the PA in Ramallah appears to be all the more in crisis as the war and intensive bombing have revealed its immobility. American plans for Gaza allow it to try and redeem its credibility by demanding, in return for its willingness to set up a government in Gaza, that a major international conference be held beforehand to find a global solution that would include the West Bank in a Palestinian state. It should be noted that dissident Fatah cadres, who see themselves as the incarnation of a reformed PA on the bangs of Mahmoud Abbas, are not opposed to Hamas joining the PLO.
What actions might these parties consider taking, and what would be their consequences?
The strategic stalemate in the Gaza Strip, and the fear of an existential threat, is driving Netanyahu to provoke an open confrontation on other fronts in order to engage the United States. This confrontation on other arenas could also be a means of diverting media attention away from the mass massacres perpetrated against civilians in Gaza. However, a full-scale war is unlikely, given that only Israel has an interest in it. The proposals put forward by the members of the war council to neutralize Hamas militarily and exclude it from the political game are hardly realistic. A return to the pre-2005 period of Israeli military occupation does not seem plausible, given the military capabilities of the armed factions in the Gaza Strip.
First Scenario: Netanyahu's headlong rush and the expulsion of Gazans
A configuration in which Netanyahu remains in power offers no prospect of an end to the aggression against the Gaza Strip, which could last several months. While the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri has restored hope of locating Yahia Sinwar, prompting Israeli forces to refocus on the town of Khan Younès, there is nothing to suggest that this new expedition will be any more favorable than the first. These difficulties on the military front, including that of setting up buffer zones and guaranteeing the return of Israelis to their kibbutzes, could push Netanyahu to implement plans for the mass deportation of Gazans desired by the right-wing fringe of the government. The encirclement of the Burej, Maghazi and Nusseirat camps in the center of the enclave and the white phosphorus bombardments lend credence to this hypothesis. The acceleration of epidemics and famine would make the expulsions look like emergency humanitarian departures. This would weaken Hamas.
Second Scenario: Netanyahu's departure and the formation of a technocrat government
Only a configuration in which Israel is confronted with internal and/or external pressures could lead to a halt in the aggression: Netanyahu's early departure, pressing American pressure, Israel's further isolation from the international court accused of genocide.
If the post-war period of 2014 had led to an exacerbation of the conflict between Gaza and Ramallah - each side having set up its own committee to economically measure the extent of the damage and the cost of reconstruction - there is no indication that this precedent will be repeated. The current context is very different from that of 2014, and the weakening of the Palestinian Authority, accelerated since its cancellation of the 2021 elections, could facilitate an agreement. All the more so as the Biden administration seems to be seeking a lasting political solution, and Egypt is supporting new players within Fatah who could facilitate the formation of a technocrat government.
Biden could pave the way for a political solution with Yoav Galant around the formation of an emergency provisional government made up of Palestinian technocrats. By preserving its armed wing, Hamas could concede some of its prerogatives in the area of civil security. This government would manage the delivery of aid from donor countries, the implementation of reconstruction and the organization of day-to-day affairs. In a second phase, it would pave the way for the holding of municipal elections, as well as an overhaul of the PLO. Hamas's entry into the PLO could be a useful way out for both Israel and the United States, for whom recognition of Hamas is a red line, in the knowledge that they will have to cooperate with it.