The Tug of War between Turkey and Israel
Turkish-Israeli relations face a number of challenges. There are many bilateral issues which determine the framework of these relations, and which draw up and define for the two countries the shape and limits of political, economic and popular exchanges. Furthermore, the regional dimension, with its complexity and difficult balance between the two sides has a major effect on determining the options available in these relations and their contours.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that the period that follows the Gaza war will leave its effect on the geopolitical sphere in the region while his supporters in the government hint at using weapons of mass destruction against the Palestinian people. To whom was that message addressed and what did it mean? And why did Erdogan hasten to respond to these statements?
There is no common frontier between Turkey and Israel but that mythical mantra, “From the Nile to the Euphrates”, repeated by some extremist Jews, is answered by many in Turkey who speak of Tel-Aviv employing several strategic devices to attain that goal in defiance of Ankara. Included here are waterways, the ethnic minorities that live on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and the trade routes and historic links investigated by Israeli experts and historians in the regions of “Upper Mesopotamia.” All these issues are present today and constitute points of pressure which determine the present and future course of relations between the two countries.[1]
Gaza: The Difficult Test
The rise and fall in the rate of belligerence and of political, media and popular antagonism in Turkish-Israeli relations have gravitated due to the influence of bilateral and regional factors. These can occasionally reach the point of recalling ambassadors and severing diplomatic relations as has happened today due to the explosive situation in Gaza. However, matters return to normal as soon as the dust settles since the commercial interests of the two countries and their intertwined political affairs and calculations, as we saw in the southern Caucasus, render this return to normalcy inevitable. The crisis arising from the assault on the Freedom Flotilla in Mediterranean waters in 2010 left its effects on both parties while the situation in Gaza has caused rifts to appear between them on more than one occasion. Nonetheless, the dictates of bilateral and regional balances have always led in the end to concluding various understandings, compromises and deals imposed by realpolitik , mutual interests and calculations of profit and loss.[2]
How will the Israeli assault on Gaza impact relations between Ankara and Tel-Aviv? Will Ankara sacrifice what it has built up over the past two years by way of bridges of interaction and open relations with Tel-Aviv? How will Turkey define its options, given the complexity of the regional scene, the possibilities of its worsening, the spreading of the conflict throughout the region, the prospect of an Iranian Israeli confrontation and of a direct US military intervention?
Before October 7, Ankara was ready to receive the Israeli Prime Minister to usher a new page in relations, set in place by the handshake between Turkish President Erdogan and Benyamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings. Netanyahu’s visit was about to take place were it not for a sudden surgical procedure which he had to undergo. But this would not have ended the process as is the case today, as confirmed by several similar and previous examples linked to Ankara’s firm policies and its attitude to the Palestinian question.
Some in Turkey and beyond betted on Turkey’s diplomacy achieving a breakthrough which would convince both Israel and HAMAS leaders of a ceasefire, the restoration of calm in Gaza and opening a path for political initiatives. But Ankara’s chances in the Crimea and its mediatory role between Moscow and Kiev to release millions of tons of Ukrainian grain are quite different from its chances in Gaza. Likewise, the balances of Turkey’s relations with Russia and the Ukraine are totally different from its relations with Israel and from its own view and ways of handling the question of Palestine.[3]
Turkey and the West in the Gaza Test
When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that the moral standards of the West are at present like a bottomless well, that statement reflected the deep divide between Turkey and the West with regard to handling the crisis in Gaza and the possibility of ending the Israeli onslaught. Ankara faces another dilemma related to its chances of success in acting as a mediator in the Palestinian Israeli conflict in Gaza. This has to do with the need to convince the Biden administration to change its policies in the region and abandon its sponsorship of Israel and its support for what Israel is doing in Gaza even before trying to convince Netanyahu and his government to abandon its siege and its extermination of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.[4]
By contrast, another fact looms large. The decision by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to visit the region more than once and meet with Arab, Gulf and Israeli leaders in the past few weeks but without visiting Ankara except weeks after the start of the war in Gaza, confining himself to phone calls--- that decision is caused by Washington’s annoyance at statements made by Erdogan early on in the conflict, his mounting objections to Pentagon’s decision to send its warships to the eastern Mediterranean and the total American identification with Israeli policy. America’s decision to play its cards with Arab capitals rather than to coordinate with Turkey means that Ankara’s chances to act as mediator and to calm the conflict have receded.
It is not in Ankara’s interests to renew tensions with Tel-Aviv after having expended much effort in restoring relations to their former state. The regional scene also makes this imperative in light of the extensive measures taken to build new commercial, security and political ties. Any escalation in tensions between Turkey and Israel would reflect itself in more than one sphere and inevitably spread to more than one place. However, it was quite clear from the start that a Turkish mediation between the two warring parties in Gaza would not succeed when compared with the chances of success of other parties. This is not because the Turkish side does not possess experience and ability to do so, but because of Turkey distancing itself, and because of the conflict in policies with Tel-Aviv and its US ally, together with the early Turkish escalation against the West resulting from the West’s condoning or being silent about the crimes committed by Israel in Gaza, and marginalizing or ignoring the Turkish role.[5]
Another factor which reveals the extent of deadlock and divergence between Turkey and Washington/Tel-Aviv, and which may have repercussions on relations with regard to the Palestine problem, is seen in the extensive military operations undertaken by Turkey against QASAD and MASAD in northern Syria. This came in the wake of attacks against Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. Turkish attacks on infrastructure systems and energy depots carried a message to the US and Israel even before it was a message to the Kurdish formations, especially since Tel-Aviv had volunteered to defend these formations against Turkish attacks.
“Tufan Al-Aqsa” Upsets All Calculations
Hours before the outbreak of “Tufan al-Aqsa” Erdogan and Netanyahu were intent upon widening their area of common understanding and of bilateral and regional cooperation, by putting into effect projects to transfer Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey and increase commercial exchanges between the two countries. Weeks after the start of the Israeli onslaught we heard Netanyahu declaring: “Erdogan who commits massacres against the Kurds and throws journalists in jail is the last person qualified to teach us any moral lessons.” Israel’s Foreign Minister, Eli Cohen, stated that Israel’s ambassador in Ankara will not return as long as Erdogan remained in power, and suggested that Ankara “should take in HAMAS terrorists.” Furthermore, Israel began to classify Turkish imports within a list of “imports from hostile countries”, while Ronen Bar, director of Israel’s Security Agency, hinted of government measures being taken to pursue HAMAS leaders in many countries, including Turkey.[6]
By contrast, and at the beginning of Israel’s onslaught, the Turkish President attempted to employ diplomatic language with Tel-Aviv, stating that his country intended to mobilize Western capitals and the international public to work to restore calm and political understanding. Ankara, he added, wished to be present at the negotiation table and take part in mediation efforts in Gaza, and to play the American, European, and international cards to counter Israeli policy. However, from early days, Erdogan found himself speaking of the need to oppose Netanyahu and his policies and of Washington bearing direct responsibility for his actions.
Erdogan soon abandoned his declared positions at the start of Israel’s onslaught and the resort to diplomacy aimed at reducing escalation prior to a ceasefire and moving the UN Security Council in that direction. Turkish disappointment was also caused by Tel-Aviv and Washington blocking the formula suggested by Ankara of having parties acting as surety for an ultimate settlement, within the framework of Erdogan’s statement that “If Israel desires perpetual security and peace, the Palestinians also must have a state.” But the savagery of the Israeli onslaught and the widespread political and party stand in Turkey against Israel’s actions are among the most salient motives that led Erdogan to assign responsibility for the onslaught to the US and Europe. He stated: “Israel is a mere pawn in the region and will be sacrificed when the time comes.” He added: “Netanyahu has inscribed his name in history as the Butcher of Gaza,” adding that Turkey intended to employ all means possible to hold the Israeli government accountable according to international law and the conscience of humanity, opening the way for his ally, Devlet Bahceli, head of the Nationalist Party, to request Turkish army intervention to stop the onslaught on Gaza.
Military developments on the ground in Gaza will in the coming months determine Ankara’s policies towards Washington and Tel-Aviv and the future of their relations. What most gladdens the heart of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party is the news coming from Tel-Aviv that, according to a recent poll, Netanyahu’s party would lose half its seats in the Knesset at the nextt elections to be held in Israel.
It is quite clear that Erdogan and his government will not hesitate to escalate the attack on Netanyahu and his government while the Israeli army persists in its war against the civilians in Gaza, even if many voices and writers in the Turkish opposition continue to raise questions regarding the reasons for contradictory governmental policies towards Tel-Aviv. In other words, there is on the one hand an escalating political and media campaign against Netanyahu and his government because of their war on Gaza but at the same time there is adherence to maintaining the commercial links with Israel following its wide onslaught on Gaza.
The current regional scene and balances both indicate that Ankara’s chances of achieving a diplomatic and political breakthrough in Gaza are very limited due to its differences with Washington over many issues and its widespread escalation of criticisms of Israel and its actions. The more viable options and alternatives before Turkey are linked to continuing a policy of openness whose results it is now reaping in Turkey’s new relations with many Arab capitals, its adherence to the declaration of the Riyad Arab-Islamic Summit, and its direct coordination with Cairo as regards the Gaza file.
Ankara will continue to hold on to the new political relations it has built with Arab capitals, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. It will endeavor not to adopt policies outside the regional consensus as it determines its policies regarding the handling of developments on the Gaza scene. However, Ankara will also take into consideration the course of military action and the possible scenario of a wider war spreading to new fronts, foremost of which is the Syrian front, which is its geographical bridge to Israel. All these are factors which will in future determine the policies and decisions of Ankara.
[1] Mohammad Chalik, "Israeli Attacks on Gaza and the Turkish Position on Palestine," Daily Sabah Newspaper, 11/10/2023.
[2] Hussein Abdulghani, "Erdogan's Complete Turn in the Gaza War Reveals the Difference Between Arab Failure and Others' Competence," Oman Newspaper, 18/11/2023.
[3] Faiq Bulut, "Turkey Will Not Sever Its Relationship with Israel," Afransal Newspaper, 13/10/2023 (in Turkish).
[4] "Erdogan: Netanyahu Wrote His Name in History as the 'Butcher of Gaza'," a speech by the Turkish President during the parliamentary bloc meeting of the Justice and Development Party, Anadolu Agency, 29/11/2023.
[5] Haki Oujal, "Is the United States Undermining Its Foundations?" Daily Sabah Newspaper, 31/12/2023.
[6] "Turkey and Gaza: The Responsibility of Turkish Muslims," an interview with the Turkish writer Alif Atlı, Anadolu Agency (in Turkish).