Barriers, Closures and Restrictions on Movement in the West Bank Following October 7
Publication Year: 
Language: 
Arabic
English
Number of Pages: 
10

Restrictions on movement and the spread of barriers in the West Bank (hereinafter WB) did not commence on October 7. The setting up of barriers and other measures aimed at isolating and fragmenting the WB have been in effect for many decades, starting with the Yigal Alon Plan of 1967 and the Ariel Sharon Plan of 1977 for creating settlements in the mountains as also other such plans. One could argue that the moment of transformation in the setting up of barriers was linked in time to the Gulf War and the signing of the Oslo Agreements in the early Nineties. The period of the Second Intifada and what followed it witnessed a crucial phase in the creation and spread of the infrastructure of the checkpoints, the separation wall and various types of barriers, while the Palestinian Uprising of 2021 marked a new chapter in restrictions on movement, coinciding with the growth of pockets of armed resistance in the northern WB. Israel tightened its stranglehold on movement between the provinces of Palestine and was ready to implement a policy of isolation, separation and the control and regulation of all movement and travel, a policy put into practice after October 7.[1] (1)

Palestinians as hostages: the policies of erection of barriers, forced expulsions, annexations and shutdowns

Following the Second Intifada, the WB was turned into separate cantons. A scenario concocted by Israel and repeated constantly spoke about “Seven Principalities”, meaning that the cities and countryside of the WB would turn into principalities enjoying less than autonomous rule, a scenario whose objective was the dismemberment and undermining of any future Palestinian state. In recent years, official Israeli declarations and policies multiplied as regards annexing Area C of the WB. What is unfolding today in the WB is a silent war, a genocide taking place quietly and out of view of the media. More than 1000 Palestinians have been evicted from Area C, especially from Bedouin encampments of which there are more than 20 in the WB.

The policy of restricting movement seeks to fragment any geographical continuity and to splinter what is already splintered, since geographical connection is non-existent among the regions of the WB, or else is fragile and tortuous. All this is carried out by means of several colonialist measures such as settlements, a separation wall, checkpoints, watchtowers, cement blocks, barbed wire, tunnels, bridges, security cameras, “blue wolf” technologies and other regimes of control, domination, and punishment. What happened after October 7 is a return to a policy of suffocating the WB with checkpoints in order to facilitate the intensification of Israeli domination and hegemony over it in a visible manner, but sometimes also in an invisible and silent manner. All this constitutes part of a plan intended to enforce annexation which in turn is part of official and unofficial Israeli policy being put into action by the settlers. These latter are striving to settle the conflict by severely constricting the lives of Palestinians in the WB and forcing them to leave or else preparing for expelling them willingly by destroying their livelihoods and their freedom of movement.

The effect of checkpoints on Palestinian life after October 7

Checkpoints affect the lives of Palestinians, directly or indirectly, in the following ways:

  • Collective punishment is exercised at checkpoints through long hours of detention, car searches, maltreatment of passengers, and smashing their personal belongings. This results in many employees and workers arriving late at their jobs and places of work.

  • Restrictions imposed on the movement of Palestinians whether inside or between cities, resulting in severe disruptions of services and institutions operating in the center of the WB (i.e. Ramallah), since a large number of employees and workers reside in the northern or southern regions of the WB.

  • Disruptions of educational institutions, such as universities and schools for various periods of time. As a result of restrictions on movement, resort is had to on-line classes, not an ideal alternative but one which helps to surmount closures and restrictions on movement.

  • Denying access to clinics and hospitals to patients and medical staff and preventing ambulances from moving quickly. Sometimes the bodies of martyrs or patients are held up for long hours at checkpoints.

  • On the social level, checkpoints have prevented families from contacting one another, creating disruptions in social relations which cannot be replaced by phone calls or electronic communication.

  • Keeping idle some 200,000 Palestinians who work in the Israeli labor market in the building, construction, agricultural, industrial and infrastructure sectors, for periods up to two months, thus adversely affecting the economy of the WB.

  • Devising new or old means of violence at checkpoints such as violent beatings, body searches, confiscating mobile phones and examining them closely. It is common for Palestinians to be beaten severely for having an image from a news bulletin or a from social media on their mobiles.

  • Destroying and wrecking the olive gathering season in Palestine. Large areas of Palestinian lands are located in Area C or else are separated by some Israeli checkpoint or barrier. With help from the settlers, the Israeli army have constricted the lives of thousands of Palestinians, preventing them from reaching their lands and harvesting their olive trees. In many cases, the harvest itself is stolen and olive trees are cut down.

  • Imposing new facts on the ground through preventing access to agricultural land, Area C, and lands near settlements. This temporary situation will become permanent Israeli policy after the current war.

  • Intensifying the geographical, social, and political disruptions and divisions among the cities of the WB, isolating them from one another socially, politically and economically as part of the “Seven Principalities” scheme, and rounding up of Palestinians in city centers (Area A).

  • Destroying the transportation sector, an essential services component in Palestinian life and economy, thus adversely affecting the families of those working in that sector. 

  • If this policy of restrictions and barriers continues, we could witness internal migrations from the countryside by inhabitants of Area A and some regions north and south of the WB towards the south, i.e. towards large urban centers, especially Ramallah, so that workers may resume their work. This recalls what happened during the Second Intifada when new suburbs appeared in Ramallah and other cities, and their residents came from outlying regions.  

The background of restrictions

Successive Israeli governments have actively been restricting the free movement of Palestinians in the West Bank, expending much effort on the security, technical and planning levels to dominate Palestinian space and lives. There is nothing new about this. Ever since the Nakba and the creation of the State of Israel, the occupation devised a system of permits in order to regulate the movement of Palestinians between their towns and cities, and this lasted throughout the period of military administration from 1948 until 1966. Following the 1967 war, Israel put in place various schemes aimed at controlling movement and transportation, and dividing Palestinians into various categories to control their movements. Israel initiated a system of permits to distinguish certain groups from others. ID’s come in various colors, each color denoting a specific geographical, political and security identity (blue IDs for inhabitants of East Jerusalem; orange for inhabitants of the WB and Gaza; green IDs for those who have a security file with the Israeli security services).

In the early seventies, Palestinians were allowed to travel between the WB and Gaza and to enter occupied territories. When the First Intifada  broke out in 1987, inhabitants of Gaza were restricted from entering Israeli occupied territories by making it conditional for them to obtain magnetic IDs. Following the Gulf War, and coinciding with the signing of the Oslo Agreements, any Palestinian resident of the WB and Gaza who wished to enter Israel needed a permit. Following the al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, Israel once again cut up the WB, built the racist apartheid wall, and prevented Palestinians from entering Jerusalem and the inner regions of Palestine except in accordance with a special permit system.

Checkpoints as a colonialist structure in the WB

In early 2023, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documented the existence of 565 barriers to movement and transportation in the WB, including East Jerusalem. These barriers include 49 checkpoints permanently manned by Israeli soldiers or by private security companies, 139 barriers which are manned by the army or private security personnel from time to time, 304 roadblocks, barriers and road gates, and 73 earth mounds, ditches and other barriers of this kind throughout all roads on the WB.[2] (2)

OCHA estimates that “Combined, there are 645 physical obstacles, an increase of about 8% compared with the 593 obstacles recorded in the previous OCHA closure survey in January-February 2020…. the number of occasionally staffed checkpoints has increased by 35% and that of road gates by 8%. While these remain open most of the time, they can be closed at any moment.”[3](3)

These numbers approximate to the number of obstacles deployed during the Second Intifada of 2000 and after. During that Intifada, there were 537 barriers of various types, according to reports issued by the B’Tselem Center for Human Rights and published in 2007. These barriers included obstacles classified as palpable (mounds of earth, cement blocks, boulders, walls, ditches and iron gates), amounting to 445 obstacles. There were 82 permanent checkpoints, 35 of which were permanent barriers examining closely all who entered Israeli territories, and 47 checkpoints to control the movement of Palestinians inside the WB, in addition to restrictions on movement by means of the separation wall, a state of siege, “flying checkpoints” and ring roads.[4](4)

Following the Palestine Uprising of 2021, the number of barriers in the WB increased as resistance escalated and phenomena such as “The Lions’ Den” the “Jenin Brigade” and other resistance formations grew apace. That Uprising and its aftermath led to closure of all unpaved and secondary roads in the northern WB, and barriers and obstacles were deployed between villages and sometimes within the same village. A stranglehold was placed on villages and the countryside, and cameras and recorders were confiscated so that the occupation authorities could monitor acts of resistance. All this was accompanied by a policy of closures and restrictions which varied in time and place.

As one travels inside the WB, one notices an increase in sudden “flying checkpoints” and restrictions of movements at barriers which had been there before October 7. In other words, what is new are policies of strangling and closure and an increase in severity of restrictions at barriers. A large number of these obstacles had already been in existence but what is happening is an intensification of restrictions on movement, car searches, close examination of Palestinian IDs, detaining cars and passengers for long hours, and the brutality of Israeli soldiers towards Palestinians. For example, before October 7, there were checkpoints where soldiers were only rarely posted, but soldiers now man these checkpoints constantly and commit violent acts against Palestinian travelers.

Checkpoints and travel after October 7: fear, loss and alternatives

Permanent Israeli checkpoints, e.g. those separating the WB from Jerusalem and the territories occupied in 1948, remained in place, such as the Qalandiya checkpoint, the “300” checkpoint in Bethlehem, the tunnels checkpoint, al-Jalama and others. In addition, checkpoints separating Palestinian cities and towns increased as did restrictions on movement and violence against travelers. Thus, crossing the “Container” checkpoint dividing the southern WB from the center often resembles a story of miraculous escape, since this checkpoint is closed for long hours resulting in a suffocating traffic jam. Palestinians thus remain idle for many hours, unable to pass or even descend from their cars. The same thing occurs at several other checkpoints.

As for the Jaba` checkpoint, near the village of Jaba`, east of Jerusalem, which separates the Ramallah province and parts of the Jerusalem countryside such as the villages of al-Ram and Kafar `Aqab from other regions of Jerusalem and areas in the center of the WB and to its south, crossing it has become a daily ordeal for travelers. For it is impossible to enter Ramallah from the southern WB or other regions of Jerusalem such as Abu Dis, al-`Ayzariyya, Shu`fat, `Anata and Hazma except through the Jaba` military checkpoint. The “Bayt Il” checkpoint has been totally closed with mounds of earth as were all other “openings and windows” through these mounds which had been used as an alternative to the Jaba` barrier or else to circumvent it. The same is true of most other such openings at checkpoints. Likewise, entering or leaving Jericho is now restricted to a very large extent, and the village of Hawwara was blockaded for an entire month, from the Hawwara to the Za`tara checkpoints, paralyzing all movement from northern WB to its center. The “Yitzhar” road was also closed and only settlers and cars with yellow license plates were allowed through. The Al-Khalil (Hebron) province was also totally shut down. In other words, all the main axes of the WB, north, south, center and east, have been paralyzed. Some Palestinians try to bypass checkpoints by walking on foot through rugged mountain paths.

The province of al-Khalil has been effectively sealed off since the beginning of the present war and entry or exit now requires more than two hours. The Palestinians use rural and unpaved roads and sometimes cross mountains and plains on foot in order to reach their destinations. The Israeli army occasionally get wise to these roads and closes them with mounds of earth.

The Palestinians have replaced the main or usual roads they used to take before October 7 with alternative routes and this for several reasons such as closures, new metal barriers, more restrictive measures at checkpoints, and an increase in the number of “flying checkpoints” that vent their fury on Palestinians, especially those with a previous prison record with the Israel Prisons Authority. Mobiles are searched and their owners are beaten if they find the “Telegram app” on them or images related to Palestinian identity. Furthermore, increasing attacks by settlers and their presence on the streets at night impedes movement even more than the flying checkpoints, and to all this may be added the closure of roads with cement blocks, mounds of earth or metal gates.

Palestinians respond by, in turn, devising alternatives. Thus, one part of the network of roads found today on the WB was opened by the Palestinians during the First Intifada while other parts which connect Palestinian villages to one another were opened during the Second Intifada. These roads constitute at present the lengthy and arduous alternative for Palestinians needing to travel between WB cities and towns. Travel from one region to another has become very difficult and takes double the time it used to take before the current restrictions were put in place. Furthermore, transportation costs have doubled for Palestinians since the driver of a public vehicle is now forced to use rugged, narrow and distant roads between villages, needing to traverse long distances to ensure the safe arrival of passengers whereas he did not previously need to do so since he used main roads with checkpoints that impeded movement to various degrees and intermittently. However, these main roads are at present closed, partially or completely, either by the same checkpoint or by mounds of earth, cement blocks and yellow gates.

Despite the constant attempts made by Palestinians to devise alternative routes, one cannot nevertheless ignore the fear they feel when travelling from one quarter to another inside the same city or between cities. Due to fear of the Israeli army and its brutality, and to the criminality and violence of the settlers, movement has decreased. `Abdullah al-Hilu, head of the union of bus owners, estimates that travel has shrunk by 60-70% inside the WB. 

The losses sustained by the Palestinians with regard to wastage of time, effort and money as a result of travel restrictions are palpable. A study conducted by Al-Arij Foundation and published in 2019 concluded that the Palestinians lost about 60 million working hours each year because of travel restrictions by the occupation regime, and this loss is estimated to cost some 270 million US dollars, in addition to some 80 million liters of extra fuel consumption leading to an annual increase of 196,000 tons of carbon dioxide being released into the atmosphere.[5] (5)

Jerusalem: impossible entry and restricted exit

With the outbreak of Israel’s war on the Palestinian people, the occupation authorities cancelled most permits given to Palestinian workers, confining their movements to the Palestinian interior, and severely restricted the movement of Jerusalemites entering the WB or leaving it.

The occupation regime closed some checkpoints permanently such as the checkpoint known as checkpoint 300, north of Bethlehem, which is closed to vehicles but not to pedestrians. The occupation also intensified measures taken at checkpoints on roads linking the WB to Jerusalem. A very thorough search takes place of all vehicles and passengers and the occupation regime deliberately obstructs traffic to deter Jerusalemites from entering the WB or leaving it. Entrance has been confined at certain checkpoints to specific hours beyond which the checkpoint is closed. As a result, checkpoints no longer operate as before, namely 24/7. For instance, the Qalandiya checkpoint opens daily from 6 am. until 4 pm and is then closed.

In Jerusalem, movement restrictions include the creation of invisible checkpoints made up of soldiers who totally control all travel and movement within Jerusalem but without setting up an official barrier. They prevent all who do not have the Old City as their address on their IDs from entering it in the afternoon. Every Friday, the occupation regime narrowly restricts the entry of Jerusalemites from outside the Old City into the Al-Asa Mosque, and there are numerous checkpoints curbing entry into the Old City and al-Aqsa. On Fridays, after October 7, the number of Palestinians who enter the al-Aqsa Mosque have not exceeded 5000, whereas before October 7 their numbers exceeded 50,000. This is all due to drastic measures taken to constrict movement with the aim of emptying Jerusalem of its residents and putting into effect a colonialist policy to impose a system of divisions in time and space upon al-Aqsa mosque.

Pressure breeds explosion: will this policy of barriers and closures work?

The immediate answer to the above question would be No. One could cite the examples of the uprisings of October 7 and the WB uprising, including Jerusalem, in the period 2014 to 2023. These all took place despite policies aimed at subverting nationalist consciousness, “shock and awe”, closures, economic hardship, the carrot and the stick, the “iron fist”, the system of permits and denials practiced by Israel throughout past decades, resorting to carrot and stick in the WB and the stick alone in Gaza. All these policies have failed.

The policy of checkpoints, closures and fragmentation might succeed on a daily level in restricting the movement of Palestinians, but this pressure has generated and will generate an inevitable explosion. Such explosions have occurred before and as the policy of punishments intensifies the Palestinian powder keg will once again explode, and this time will not subside. Again, a colonialist policy of violating and utterly ignoring Palestinian rights will drive the Palestinians to act, despite all efforts expended by the occupation to curtail geographical, political and organizational movement. Checkpoints may render some areas invisible or inaccessible, but an alternate road will acquaint the Palestinians with their countryside, topography and olive orchards, and will strengthen the bonds between the Palestinians and their land and identity.

 

[1] The ideas in the paper are based on ethnographic observations by the researcher and some personal conversations with Palestinians from various regions. Additionally, the study relies on daily monitoring, including insights from the "Monitor of Israeli Imperialism and the Policies of Apartheid," issued by the Institute for Palestine Studies.

[2] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Movement and Access in the West Bank | July 2023," retrieved on 12/3/2023.

[3] Same source

[4] B'Tselem, "Ground to a Halt: Denial of Palestinians' Freedom of Movement in the West Bank," retrieved on 11/27/2023.

[5] Arij Institute, "Palestinians lose about 60 million work hours annually due to Israeli military barriers in the West Bank," retrieved on 12/1/2023.

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Author Bio: 

Ahmad Ezzeddin As'ad, a lecturer at Bethlehem University and a researcher at the Institute for Palestine Studies.