The Tufan al-Aqsa, a strategic and unprecedented operation in the history of the Palestine/Israel conflict, carried out by HAMAS against the settlements bordering Gaza on October 7, 2023, has led to a situation unprecedented in this conflict, and this from two points of view:
First, a very large number of Israeli soldiers and civilians fell dead or wounded, a human loss never experienced by Israel before. This made Israel lose its balance especially since it was unable to prevent or predict what happened, a matter considered a catastrophic intelligence and security failure, and a military and morale blow which left a deep shock in the self confidence of Israelis and their trust in their security system and leadership, and in their individual and collective sense of security.
Secondly, the presence of some 240 prisoners in the hands of the Palestinian resistance and their ability to retain them until the time of the present writing, is a matter which added an extra dimension to the operation which has nothing to do with the military and political objectives resulting from the war, but is a domestic dimension to do with these prisoners and their families.
Israel has traditionally regarded any of its soldiers or citizens kidnapped or imprisoned by the resistance movements as a strategic event. To prevent this from happening, Israel’s leaders would prefer it if the price to be paid was the death of both the kidnapped and the kidnappers, known as the “Hannibal” Protocol.[1] This is due to the far-reaching security, political and psychological consequences which place Israel at a weak juncture, liable to blackmail, and force it to enter into
(indirect) negotiations where it is obliged to pay a heavy “price.” This also affects its deterrence capability and image and obliges it to deal with people who do not recognize it or its legitimacy, an implicit recognition of such people. This has occurred even though pressure by Israeli society frequently prevented recourse to this since the liberation of Israeli prisoners occupies a strategic place in the discourse of Israeli society in general. Quite apart from the fact that “ransoming a prisoner” is a religious duty,[2] Israeli society displays a great deal of sensitivity and is ready to pay a high price in return for freeing its prisoners. Hence, we have witnessed numerous deals struck according to which Israel freed thousands of Palestinian prisoners in return for freeing a very limited number of its own prisoners. This takes place in accordance with an unwritten covenant between society and the state whereby the state covenants to free prisoners fallen into “enemy” hands no matter the price, in return for guaranteeing that society and its families continue to send their sons and daughters to do military service and expose their lives to danger.
The presence of this very large number of prisoners in the Gaza Strip has made “freeing” them one of the war objectives in the war waged by Israel on Gaza,[3] and part of Israel’s information and political discourse. Furthermore, “freeing” them has become an international demand, repeated by pro-Israeli world leaders, and constitutes portions of international resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN. This in turn has made it into an image of victory or else the criterion according to which the results of the war are measured, especially as the calls to end this have grown ever louder on the part of the families of the Israeli prisoners, and the fact that many states have now begun to mediate between Israel and the Resistance.
The question of prisoners and its standing in Israel and Palestine
Israel holds some 7,000 Palestinian prisoners in its jails, some of whom have spent four decades behind bars. They are a mere fraction of the more than one million Palestinian men and women arrested by the Occupation authorities since they occupied Palestinian lands in 1967.[4]
Conditions inside these jails are extremely harsh, especially after October 7. Seven prisoners have already been martyred during the last month and a half because of maltreatment, torture and the cruel punishments to which they have been subjected.
The issue of Palestinian prisoners is one which carries weight, ethical, psychological, political and religious, within Palestinian society. It touches every household, and the prisoners are seen as in the forefront of those who fought and sacrificed for the sake of their society, quite apart from the fact that, as a group, they are influential since many of them occupied important leadership posts in the Palestine Liberation Organization and in various Palestinian resistance movements. This is specially the case in this period when the battle against Israel’s assault on Gaza and when Israeli prisoners are held by former Palestinian prisoners many of whom were freed in accordance with the deal struck between HAMAS and Israel in 2011. The most prominent of these were Yahya al-Sinwar, Ruhi Mushtaha and Salih al-`Aruri [Al-`Aruri was released by order of the Supreme Court in 2010 and exiled outside Palestine].
Furthermore, the freeing of prisoners is held to be one of the principal demands and objectives to which all powerful Palestinian movements subscribe, on the nationalist, political, legal and military levels. In fact, some people regard it as a national and religious priority equal in its importance and priority to the liberation of the land.[5]
On the other hand, prisoner exchange deals concluded with Israel since 1975 have taken place between soldiers belonging to armies of Arab states (Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria) and Israeli soldiers, and these deals involved roughly equal numbers on both sides. They have usually been carried out easily and without any complications since they concern exchanges of soldiers in regular armies where the fighting between them has ceased.
However, a radical change occurred in 1979, when Israel released 76 Palestinian prisoners in return for one soldier. This was followed by another deal involving 3700 prisoners in return for six soldiers, and then by the famous Ahmad Jibril deal where 1150 prisoners were released in return for three soldiers. All these were deals between Israel and certain Palestinian movements, to be followed by several deals concluded with the Lebanese Hizbullah Party. Finally, the deal known as “Fulfillment of Promise by Free Men” or as the “Shalit deal” was concluded, whereby 1072 Palestinian prisoners were released in return for a single Israeli soldier.[6]
Those repeated deals, and the heavy price paid by Israel to get their soldiers back have raised a storm of debate inside Israel regarding the legality, effectiveness and morality of these deals, especially as they went on to develop and to involve the freeing of prisoners in return for corpses of soldiers, and occasionally civilians, and to move from the outside inwards (Gaza).
An unwritten covenant
The issue of the price, effectiveness and possible damages resulting from each prisoner exchange deal, and whether the price demanded by Palestinian and Arab movements of resistance was a sign of strength, contributing to the cohesion and immunity of society and its faith in its leaders and army; or whether, on the other hand, it exposed a weakness and provided an opportunity to conduct further kidnapping operations and further blackmail for Israel---all these issues became points of unceasing contention inside Israeli society. It was a debate which always ended with the same result, i.e. that Israel could not abandon its soldiers and citizens as prisoners in the hands in the hands of Arab movements or states, in view of the negative effects of this policy on society and on military mobilization. This was also regarded as touching upon a more lofty religious and social ideal of “ransoming a prisoner” and likely to negatively impact social unity and to cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of the side that takes that decision, given the information and mass pressure led usually by the families of prisoners.
Israel, despite its assent to the unwritten covenant between the military and political establishment on the one hand and the society of army recruits on the other, has nevertheless attempted to limit the price it was prepared to pay for each prisoner and each time these attempts ended in failure, especially the one undertaken by former Defense Minister and Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The man was known for his distinguished war record (“Number One soldier” and holder of most military decorations) and the deal was done through forming a special committee in 2008 headed by retired Supreme Court judge Meir Shimgar.[7] The work of that committee lasted four years and, in the end, presented a secret 100-page report which the public was not allowed to see, since the committee had decided from its formation that its report would not be made public and that its recommendations will not be implemented before the end of negotiations and the return of Gilad Shalit, the soldier imprisoned by HAMAS.
Despite the report’s secret nature, some general principles were leaked which specified the framework charged with conducting the negotiations (Ministry of Defense) and the mode of negotiations (teams and not middlemen or representatives of the Prime Minister) and further classified those imprisoned according to their importance (soldier or citizen kidnapped inside the country; citizen kidnapped abroad; citizen who mistakenly enters enemy territory). The committee also established a hierarchy in the modes to be employed in handling the issue of prisoners, beginning with exhausting all military means to free them, to be followed by pressure and diplomacy on the international level, and finally negotiations. Only a few individuals were to be released in return for each soldier. These principles came to summarize a long history of dealing with prisoner exchanges, and now are being put to the real test in dealing with approximately 240 Israeli prisoners held by the resistance in the Gaza Strip.
The need for an image of victory
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For HAMAS
Although Muhammad Dayf, commander of the Qassam Brigades who led the Tufan al-Aqsa operation, did not mention the prisoners in the speech launching the operation and distributed to the media to coincide with its beginning, the freeing of prisoners was considered the principal objective behind the kidnapping operation and the final image that would crown its operation, assuming the shape of a victory in emptying the prisons, and releasing the prisoners.[8] A fact of additional importance is achieved through a successful prisoner swap to be achieved by HAMAS is its ability to compensate for the scenes of destruction left by the war and the martyrdom of thousands of women and children. Furthermore, the issue of the prisoners, especially the soldiers, is held to be a strong means of pressure in the hands of HAMAS, which it intends to hold on to until the war’s end, to improve its terms of negotiation. In return, it will attempt to maneuver and reduce the ferocity of the assault and siege and the price in human lives in certain humanitarian cases (children and women).
HAMAS is fully aware that retaining the prisoner card will turn it into a major player with whom regional and international mediators will seek to communicate, a matter which implies its legitimacy as opposed to the attempts to demonize and spurn it internationally. It would also constitute an important propaganda coup to be used to improve its image and to establish an information agenda to serve it in its battle.
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For Israel
Israel received a strategic and unprecedented blow on October 7. To deal with the negative impact of that event on its prestige, deterrence capability and standing in the region and the world, Israel attempts to achieve a decisive and undoubted victory over HAMAS. At stake is Israel’s prestige and image, so each concession or softening before HAMAS would be a strategic event, a situation that severely restricts its leaders from showing any sign of leniency---indeed, urges them to seek an image of a clear and total victory.
This strategic, psychological and morale situation, as it impacts the issue of the kidnapped in Gaza, ties the hands of the military and security leadership, especially since freeing the prisoners has become a second main objective of the war (second to the ending of HAMAS rule and disarming it).
Mounting popular pressure and an ever-widening circle of influencers, politicians and former army generals speaking about the families of prisoners, added to the very large space now occupied by this issue in media and internal debate---all this constitutes a factor equal in importance to other factors with whom it is vying for importance. Additionally, the families of prisoners and the campaigns supporting them leave no room for maneuver on the security or political levels when slogans such as “Today! And all we have in return for all they have!”
The solution of this dilemma contrived by the political and military leadership consists in adopting the demand to free the prisoners as one war aim, but accompanied by insistence by the kitchen cabinet or “war cabinet” that continued pressure and war and tightening the siege of civilians in Gaza are all factors that permit Israel to hold onto means of pressure on HAMAS, forcing it to release the prisoners. In response to street pressure, to US demands and to interference by mediators, the “war cabinet” has shown some flexibility in dealing with the question of freeing some prisoners in return for a ceasefire lasting a few limited days and facilitating the entry of humanitarian aid. These attempts illustrate the size of complexity and of the gap between HAMAS and Israel, and the lack of trust between them, a matter which in the coming days reduces the level of expectations.
Anticipated scenarios
Given the picture drawn above, it becomes clear that agreement upon a framework of a solution which ensures an image of victory and achievement for both sides, as also a middle ground from which all parties emerge as winners is seemingly impossible. Hence several scenarios are possible.
First scenario
Achieving a partial agreement whereby HAMAS is granted a short ceasefire and aid is allowed in, in return for releasing some prisoners for humanitarian reasons. This would win Netanyahu some credibility with the families of prisoners and reduce pressure upon him.
The advantage of this scenario is that it is possible to market it as a temporary, necessary, and humanitarian measure which does not affect Israel’s plans or the continuation of the fighting. It also allows HAMAS to catch its breath and reduce external pressure, while implicit in it is the possibility of creating a regional, international, and Israeli system able to transform this scenario into a series of exchanges leading ultimately to ending the fighting.
Second scenario
The ability of HAMAS to retain the prisoners it is holding and to continue the fighting, coupled with Israel declaring the end of the war without achieving its objectives, either through its losses or through internal and international pressure or some unexpected event, a situation which would enable HAMAS to free all their male and female prisoners and perhaps impose itself on any future scheme to govern the Gaza Strip.
Third scenario
This is in case Israel succeeds in applying continuous military and humanitarian pressure (continued state of siege), along with further deployment of its soldiers inside the Strip and the impact this would have plus the opportunity to gather information, assassinate leaders, and weaken HAMAS, thereby making the end of fighting dependent upon the return of prisoners.
Fourth scenario
Israel succeeds in identifying where prisoners are being held, launches attacks or carries out special operations to free them, ending either in killing some or all of them or else freeing them.
Conclusion
At this present moment in the fighting all the scenarios above seem possible. However, one matter cannot be ignored, namely, that the mode of the war’s end and duration of the fighting will depend decisively on what that end will look like and what will finally happen to the Israeli prisoners. It does not appear that HAMAS has lost its ability to manage this issue, which implies that these prisoners are a very valuable advantage in its hands, while the war’s commanders are still able to gain time and to maneuver in front of these prisoner families coinciding with intensifying pressure on the ground and seeking military solutions to the problem. The situation on the field of battle where the results of the war appear to be nil and not amenable to compromise, is what will decisively determine which of the scenarios above will eventually force itself.
[1] عميت سيجال، "بضع كلمات عن قانون هنيبال" (بالعبرية).
[2] "الحاخام تمير جرانوت: مبادئ قومية وأخلاقية في افتداء الأسرى"، "القناة 7"، 14/11/2023 (بالعبرية).
[3] "موحدون خلف اهداف الحرب: نتنياهو جالنت جانتس"، مؤتمر صحافي، 28/10/2023 (بالعبرية).
[4] "مليون أسير فلسطيني منذ سنة 1967" "العربي الجديد"، 17/4/2019.
[5] "واجب الأمة تجاه أسرى فلسطين"، هيئة علماء المسلمين.
[6] "مختصر تاريخ صفقات التبادل الكبرى التي نفذتها إسرائيل"، "القناة 13"، 12/7/2017 (بالعبرية).
[7] "جنة شمغار تقدم تقريرها: انتهى عهد الوسطاء"، واي نت، 5/1/2012 (بالعبرية).
[8] "ثمنه تبييض سجون الاحتلال›.. القسام: مستعدون لإنهاء ملف الأسرى الإسرائيليين"، التلفزيون العربي، 28/10/2023.