

AS YOU RECALL IN MADRID, I MADE IT CLEAR PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT I WAS PREPARED TO SEE THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TRY TO SORT OUT THE VENUE AND TIMING OF THE NEXT ROUND OF DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

SINCE THEN, I CONVEYED TO YOU SEVERAL IDEAS FROM ISRAEL.

Baker letter  
22/11/91 (1)

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ON HOW TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS WERE NOT APPROVED BY ANY OTHER PARTY.

, - THE BREAKTHROUGH THAT YOU ACHIEVED IN MADRID SEVERAL WEEKS AGO CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO DISSIPATE. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES TO CREATE MOMENTUM TO PROVE THAT DIRECT BILATERAL TALKS CAN BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF MOST CONCERN TO YOU.

-- I UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED IN SORTING OUT THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE. I DO NOT MINIMIZE THEM, BUT NEITHER DO I BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BECOME, IN AND OF THEMSELVES, REASONS TO BLOCK FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN THIS MESSAGE I WANT TO ADDRESS THREE ISSUES: FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE VENUE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS; DETERMINING THE BEST DATE TO HOLD THE NEXT ROUND; AND BEGINNING TO FORESHADOW THE KINDS OF ISSUES THAT EACH OF YOU MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE UP IN ORDER TO MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS MOST PRODUCTIVE.

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VENUE AND TIMING  
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-- IT IS CLEAR THAT MADRID WILL NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE VENUE FOR THE NEXT ROUND. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT YET TO HOLD TALKS IN THE REGION.

-- I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT, OVER TIME, THERE IS NO REASON TO EXCLUDE HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE REGION. MANY SUCCESSFUL TALKS HAVE BEEN HELD IN THE REGION IN THE PAST AND A REGIONAL VENUE WOULD ALLOW CLOSE PROXIMITY FOR THE NEGOTIATORS TO CONSULT WITH THEIR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. BUT I UNDERSTAND WE WILL NOT RESOLVE THIS ISSUE NOW.

, - WE HAVE CONSULTED ON THIS MATTER WITH THE SOVIETS AND WE AGREE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE NOW IS TO RESUME THE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- ACCORDINGLY, I AM PLEASED TO INVITE EACH OF YOU TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4.

-- IN ORDER TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS, I WILL NEED YOUR AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE NO LATER THAN MONDAY, NOVEMBER 25.

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-- THE UNITED STATES WILL ARRANGE THE SITES FOR THE TALKS AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES; THE TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE HERE IN WASHINGTON.

-- EACH DELEGATION WILL BE EXPECTED TO ASSUME ALL/ALL OTHER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION, LODGING STAFF SUPPORT AND THE LIKE.

-- WE WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO MEET DELEGATIONS ON ARRIVAL BUT, WITH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL TIME, WE WILL ALERT AIRPORT AUTHORITIES TO YOUR PLANNED ARRIVAL.

-- THE DELEGATIONS TO THESE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT/NOT BE THE SAME AS THOSE THAT ATTENDED THE MADRID CONFERENCE. IN ORDER TO ENSURE HOWEVER, THAT THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS AGREED UPON FOR THIS PROCESS OBTAIN, WE NEED TO KNOW IN ADVANCE THE COMPOSITION OF EACH DELEGATION. OUR INTENTION WOULD BE TO NOTIFY THE COMPOSITION OF EACH DELEGATION TO ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN ADDITION, WE ENVISAGE NO PARTICULAR CREDENTIALING FOR THE DELEGATIONS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE HELD IN U.S. GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, ACCESS TO THOSE BUILDINGS WILL BE AVAILABLE ONLY FOR THOSE DECLARED AS DELEGATES. OTHER ADVISERS AND STAFF WILL NOT BE PERMITTED AT THE SITES OF THE NEGOTIATION, BUT SHOULD PLAN TO REMAIN IN WHATEVER OFFICES ARE SET UP BY THE DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES.

-- SIMILARLY, WE PLAN TO PROVIDE NO PRESS FACILITIES, AND ANY PRESS ACTIVITY BY DELEGATES WILL HAVE TO BE ARRANGED BY THE DELEGATIONS THEMSELVES.

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SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS  
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-- AS ALL OF US EXPECTED, THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS IN MADRID COVERED LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE GROUND, AND THUS PROVIDED NO REAL DIRECTION AS TO WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOW HEAD.

-- IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. OR SOVIET UNION, AS CO-SPONSORS, TO SUGGEST TO YOU WHAT TO DO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, WE THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL FOR US TO SHARE SOME PRELIMINARY THINKING ON WHICH APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT HELP GET THEM LAUNCHED SUCCESSFULLY.

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ISRAEL-JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN TALKS  
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-- IN THE CASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE

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JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT SETS OF ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE DISCUSSED.

-- JORDAN HAS NOTIFIED US AND PRESUMABLY ISRAEL, THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF BORDER ISSUES UNRELATED TO U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 WHICH NEED TO BE DISCUSSED. WE SEE NO REASON WHY THESE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RAISED EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT EXPERTS CAN GET TO WORK TO EXAMINE RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL AND JORDAN COULD PROFITABLY DISCUSS A NUMBER OF OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NATURE OF PEACE, THE RESOLUTION OF MARITIME PROBLEMS IN THE GULF OF AQABA, JOINT MANAGEMENT OF WASTE WATER FACILITIES JOINT PRODUCTION OF POTASH, TOURISM, CIVIL AVIATION AND THE LIKE, WHICH COULD FORM THE ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT, ONCE THE ELEMENTS OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT BEGIN TO FALL INTO PLACE, OR ALTERNATIVELY AS INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS OR UNILATERAL MEASURES TO SERVE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE AND PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

-- AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IT IS THE EXPECTATION OF BOTH SIDES THAT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, PALESTINIANS FROM THE JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WOULD ALSO ATTEND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE

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INTEGRITY OF THE JOINT DELEGATION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

-- WITH REGARD TO ISSUES RELATING TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IT IS SIMILARLY OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD TAKE THE LEAD BUT WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY JORDANIANS AS PART OF THE JOINT JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION.

-- IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THERE IS ALREADY AGREEMENT THAT THE FIRST PHASE WILL FOCUS ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS.

-- HAVING EXPERIENCED SEVERAL YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE ISSUES IN THE LATE 1970'S AND EARLY 1980'S, IT IS OUR CONSIDERED VIEW THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS SHOULD AVOID AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE A PROTRACTED DEBATE ON SUCH PRINCIPLES AS THE "SOURCE OF AUTHORITY", "NATURE OF THE INTERIM SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY", AND THE LIKE.

-- RATHER, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT AGREE THAT EACH WOULD PRESENT IN THIS OR THE NEXT SESSION A PROPOSED MODEL OF INTERIM SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY.

-- SUCH MODELS ARE LIKELY TO BE QUITE DIFFERENT; THEY WILL VARY WIDELY IN TERMS OF THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION THAT THEY ANTICIPATE EXTENDING TO PALESTINIANS. NONETHELESS, THEY WILL PROVIDE BOTH SIDES WITH SOME POTENTIALLY USEFUL STARTING POINTS TO BEGIN HAMMERING OUT THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES THAT WILL BE ASSUMED BY PALESTINIANS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AS WELL AS THE ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE DEFINED AND NEGOTIATED DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD.

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ISRAEL/LEBANON TALKS  
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-- WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON THERE ARE CLEAR DIFFERENCES AS TO HOW TO PROCEED.

-- IN OUR VIEW IT MIGHT BE MOST PRODUCTIVE FOR BOTH SIDES TO START ENGAGING ON THE MOST PRACTICAL ISSUE THAT THEY BOTH CONFRONT: NAMELY, HOW TO UNLOCK THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN JAZZINE.

-- BY THIS, WE DO NOT MEAN IN ANY WAY A DEPARTURE FROM PRINCIPLES OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT TO SUBSTITUTE A JAZZINE SETTLEMENT FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, SINCE THE JAZZINE ISSUE INVOLVES THE COMPLEX OF POLITICAL AND

SECURITY ISSUES THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT EXTEND THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN LEBANON AND NORTHERN ISRAEL, IT CAN REPRESENT A USEFUL FIRST STEP AND IT CAN DEMONSTRATE TO BOTH PARTIES THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN PRODUCE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND.

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ISRAEL-SYRIA TALKS

-- WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, THE FIVE HOURS OF TALKS HELD NOVEMBER 3 INDICATED THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL FIND IT EASY TO PROCEED UNTIL KEY ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE ARE RECOGNIZED BY THE OTHER SIDE. WHILE NOT DIMINISHING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO EACH PARTY STRICT ADHERENCE TO THEM COULD LEAD TO EARLY STALEMATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- ONE WAY TO PROCEED, IN OUR VIEW, MIGHT BE TO PROBE THE OTHER SIDE'S POSITION IN CERTAIN HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, SYRIA MIGHT ASK, HYPOTHETICALLY, WHAT THE ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE IF SYRIA WERE PREPARED, AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS, AND WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ALTERNATIVELY, SYRIA MIGHT ASK WHETHER UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES ISRAEL WOULD EXCLUDE WITHDRAWAL AND A RETURN TO SYRIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER GOLAN.

-- ISRAEL, FOR ITS PART, MIGHT ASK HYPOTHETICALLY WHAT SYRIA'S POSITION ON A PEACE TREATY, FULL NORMALIZATION AND

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DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD BE IF ISRAEL WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE WITHDRAWAL. ALTERNATIVELY, ISRAEL MIGHT ASK WHETHER UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES SYRIA WOULD EXCLUDE A TREATY OF PEACE, FULL NORMALIZATION AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

-- WHILE THIS KIND OF DIALOGUE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY OVERCOME DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE, IT COULD PERMIT THE SIDES TO BEGIN EXPIORING SOME OF THE ISSUES RAISED DURING THESE PRESENTATIONS. BAKER

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