Until the advent of the Trump administration, successive US governments consistently upheld the international consensus on Jerusalem. Forming more than a concession to its international partners and Arab sentiment, this above all reflects the instrumental role Washington played in crafting foundational UN resolutions on the status of Jerusalem during the late 1940s. Thus, as with so much else that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, the international consensus on Jerusalem bears a distinctively American imprint and reflects the US conception of its national security interests in a vital geopolitical region.
The above notwithstanding, Washington’s commitment to the policy has changed over the decades as the political situation in both the Middle East and within the United States underwent important transformations. Until 1967, successive American administrations refused to make concessions to Israel, Jordan, or for that matter the pro-Israel lobby with respect to the status of Jerusalem as formulated by the UN with US participation.
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, and what might be characterized as Washington’s elevation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 at the expense of the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the United States began to adopt shared sovereignty as an alternative to international administration. On the one hand, Washington rejected Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem on the grounds that its status cannot be determined by unilateral action,[1] and characterised it as part of the occupied Palestinian territories rather than of Israel. At the same time, Secretary of State William Rogers in 1969 formulated a new US policy pursuant to which the status of Jerusalem was to be jointly determined by Israel and Jordan. Rogers further stated that both states should play a role in “the civic, economic, and religious life of the city”; that it should be unified; and that the resolution of its status should form part of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement.[2]
With Rogers effectively renouncing the US commitment to a corpus separatum under international administration and adopting a policy objective of shared sovereignty on the basis of a negotiated political settlement, discussion commenced over how a city could remain unified under such circumstances. In 1980, Rogers’s successor Cyrus Vance clarified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that from the US perspective this simply meant that Jerusalem should not again be divided by barbed wire as it had been between 1948 and 1967.[3] This would, in various iterations, remain US policy until the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords. In presenting his 1982 initiative, for example, President Ronald Reagan stated:
[T]he United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel ... [I]t is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace. We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through the negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which … remains wholly valid as the foundation-stone of America's Middle East peace effort. It is the United States' position that - in return for peace - the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza … Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.[4]
As the United States gradually came to view Palestinians as legitimate participants in negotiations about their own future, including with respect to East Jerusalem, Secretary of State James Baker conveyed the following in his Letter of Assurance to the Palestinian delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference:
The United States understands how much importance Palestinians attach to the question of east Jerusalem ... It remains the firm position of the United States that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city and that its final status should be decided by negotiations. Thus, we do not recognize Israel's annexation of east Jerusalem or the extension of its municipal boundaries, and we encourage all sides to avoid unilateral acts that would exacerbate local tensions or make negotiations more difficult or preempt their final outcome ... And, the United States supports the right of Palestinians to bring any issue, including east Jerusalem, to the table.[5]
If there is ambiguity in the above and in similar official US statements prior to 1993, these notably called for a negotiated resolution of the status of “Jerusalem” rather than of “East Jerusalem”, and did so within a context of continued US rejection of Israel’s annexation of the latter. Seen in historical context, such declarations should therefore be primarily understood as representing a shift in US policy from support for international administration as formulated by the United Nations towards the promotion of shared sovereignty resulting from a political settlement, rather than endorsement of shared sovereignty over East Jerusalem. This interpretation is also consistent with a US Cold War agenda that sought to position Washington as the sole mediator between Israel and the Arab states, and in so doing displace the international community and the Soviet Union in particular. Similarly, US support for an “undivided” Jerusalem in the context of its simultaneous endorsement of shared sovereignty can reasonably be inferred as a policy preference for an open city as opposed to support for exclusive Israel control of the Holy City.
While it is unambiguously the case that successive US governments became increasingly uncritical of Israeli policies in East Jerusalem, and went to extraordinary lengths to shield the occupation authorities from international criticism and accountability, there is at the same time no record of US efforts to promote Israel’s claims for sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Thus, the United States exercised its veto on at least eight occasions since 1976 to prevent the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions that specifically censured Israel for measures that sought to alter the status of the Holy City, change the status quo at the Haram al-Sharif, or for settlement activities that contributed to the transformation of the demography and topography of East Jerusalem.
Indeed, US support for and/or acquiescence in Israel’s settlement project in East Jerusalem and its environs has been critical to its continuation and expansion during the past half century. This included not only diplomatic support but also, for example, permitting US organisations to funnel resources to such settlements and giving them tax-free status under US law.
It was only in the aftermath of the 1993 Oslo Agreements – to which the US was a witness and which explicitly characterized Jerusalem as an issue to be resolved by negotiations – that Washington began to support Israel’s position that East Jerusalem and indeed the occupied Palestinian territories in their entirety are negotiable. Thus, President Bill Clinton formulated the following proposal in 2000 as part of what came to be known as the Clinton Parameters:
The general principle [regarding sovereignty in East Jerusalem] is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well.
Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount … I add to these two additional formulations…
1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part or b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part.
There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.
-
2. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.
While representing an unprecedented US promotion of Israeli claims over East Jerusalem, and an endorsement of its illegal settlement enterprise in the Holy City, this statement introduced the prospect of further Israeli excavations below the Haram al-Sharif that have been a critical Palestinian concern since 1967,[6] Washington nevertheless continued to withhold formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, East or West, in the absence of a negotiated peace. The same principles guided the policies of the George W. Bush and Barrack Obama administrations. Perhaps reflecting the consistent US failure to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, Secretary of State John Kerry in his musings on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shortly before departing office offered the following assessment:
Provide an agreed resolution for Jerusalem as the internationally recognized capital of the two states, and protect and assure freedom of access to the holy sites consistent with the established status quo. Now, Jerusalem is the most sensitive issue for both sides, and the solution will have to meet the needs not only of the parties, but of all three monotheistic faiths. That is why the holy sites that are sacred to billions of people around the world must be protected and remain accessible and the established status quo maintained. Most acknowledge that Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967, and we believe that. At the same time, there is broad recognition that there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.[7]
If US presidents, including those who as candidates pledged to recognize Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, had to contend with the world beyond Israel in formulating policies on Jerusalem, the US Congress developed a habit of prioritising Israeli interests over US relations with other states. Beginning in the 1980s, a series of non-binding congressional resolutions supporting Israel’s claims to sovereignty over Jerusalem passed, either unanimously or overwhelmingly, and culminated in the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act. Replete with references to “King David’s entry” to Jerusalem, “the 25th anniversary of the [1967] reunification of Jerusalem”, “our democratic friend and strategic ally, the State of Israel”, the Jerusalem Embassy Act, drafted by the pro-Israel lobby at the height of the Oslo era as part of a coordinated campaign with opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu to scuttle peace prospects.[8] The Act called upon the US government to officially recognize Jerusalem “as the capital of the State of Israel”, instructed the government to relocate the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem no later than 1999, and stipulated a schedule of financial sanctions targeting the State Department budget should it fail to comply.[9] Adopted with Soviet-style majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives, it did however permit the president to sign a waiver suspending implementation at six month intervals. As expected, every president, up to and including Donald Trump, has utilised this loophole.[10] The legislative act did however eventually achieve its objectives, both by providing the immediate backdrop to Trump’s 2018 change of policy and the subsequent Palestinian boycott of US diplomatic initiatives.
The Jerusalem Policies of US Allies and International Partners
The policies of key US allies and international partners on Jerusalem have traditionally formed part of the international consensus and evolved along with it. The changes that have transpired over time are in turn linked to significant developments in the region and often take their cue from resulting UN resolutions.
These changes can be divided into three periods. The first, from 1947 to 1967, was characterised by support for a corpus separatum under international administration as initially set forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. The second, commencing in 1967 and based on UN Security Council 242, promoted a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 War and a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, resulting in shared Israeli-Jordanian sovereignty over the Holy City. The third and present phase, which commenced during the 1980s and was solidified after 1993, witnessed a decisive turn towards a two-state settlement in which a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem is established alongside Israel with its capital in West Jerusalem. Various proposals have furthermore been formulated to ensure that Jerusalem is an open city with religious access for all.
The European Union did not adopt a unified policy on Jerusalem until 1980, when the Venice Declaration committed member states to oppose any unilateral measures affecting the status of the Holy City.[11] More recently, among the first resolutions adopted by the EU after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty established a common foreign policy, was a statement of formal support for the position that Jerusalem should be the capital of two states.[12] Rather than reflecting a change of policy by EU member states, it functioned as a statement of their collective position.
Although the Arab states rejected the partition of Palestine in 1947 and subsequently refused to recognize Israel, most came to informally support the internationalisation of Jerusalem during the subsequent two decades. During the 1980s, the League of Arab States adopted resolutions that all but explicitly endorsed the two-state settlement.[13] Since 2002, when the Arab League adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, it has effectively subscribed to shared Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem.[14] Similarly, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which established a Jerusalem Committee after 1967 to defend Arab/Muslim rights in the Holy City, has since 1981 taken the position that Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian state.[15]
Elsewhere, significant international actors like Russia, China, and Japan each have policies that stipulate that West Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of an independent Palestinian state in the context of a negotiated settlement.[16] As Trump took office in January 2017 and unleashed his “peace team” on the Middle East, the international community stood united in its position on the present and future status of Jerusalem, both East and West.
The Trump Administration and Jerusalem
On 6 December 2017, the Trump Administration uprooted seventy years of US policy by formally recognizing “Jerusalem” as “the capital of Israel” and announcing its intention to relocate the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to “Jerusalem” – a process which commenced in May 2018. Explaining his decision, President Trump cited, among other factors, the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act and its recent re-affirmation by the US Senate;[17] his campaign pledge to undertake the measures at hand; the failure to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace and his conviction these policy changes would facilitate successful diplomacy; Israel’s purported right to freely determine the location of its capital city; and the location of Israeli government agencies in Jerusalem as well as regularity of meetings US officials conduct there with their counterparts.[18] To these reasons most independent observers added Trump’s desire to keep his evangelical Christian supporters mobilized, persistent lobbying by his son-in-law Jared Kushner and other members of the self-styled US peace team; and the fulfilment of a commitment to his most significant donor, the hard-line Zionist casino magnate Sheldon Adelson and his Israeli wife Miriam.[19]
That same day Trump also signed his second presidential waiver under the Jerusalem Embassy Act, a requirement to avoid financial penalties because the US government had not yet commenced with the process of relocating its embassy.
Although Trump in his oral statement and written declaration pointedly avoided any reference to Palestinian rights or aspirations, or to the existence of East and West Jerusalem, or the geographic contours of his act of recognition, he nevertheless stated that “We are not taking a position on any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders.”[20]
In what quickly developed into a game of intra-administration ping pong, the following day, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declared that the final status of Jerusalem remained a matter for the parties to resolve through negotiations,[21] only to be contradicted the following month by Trump’s statement issued during a joint press conference in Switzerland with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, that “the hardest subject they had to talk about was Jerusalem. We took Jerusalem off the table, so we don’t have to talk about it anymore.”[22] In February, Tillerson again declared that the final status of Jerusalem was for the parties to decide, and in March Trump retorted that Jerusalem was “off the table”.[23] That the US had affixed its signature on the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian agreement that explicitly identified Jerusalem as a permanent status issue subject to negotiation between the parties went unmentioned
Given the absence of clarity, excess of contradiction, and generous helpings of confusion, for many it is difficult to discern the current US position on the final status of Jerusalem beyond the reality that Washington has recognized it as the capital of Israel and done so prior to the commencement of negotiations the Trump “peace team” was said to be preparing.
Yet, as is often the case in such matters, the refusal of the US to provide further details or place any limitations on the nature and scope of its act of recognition, in the continued absence of any official statement on Palestinian rights to Jerusalem, has been interpreted as an unconditional US recognition of Israel’s definition of its sovereign claims over Jerusalem and an endorsement of Israel’s claim to exclusive sovereignty over the entirety of the Holy City.
Particularly when placed alongside the Trump administration’s persistent failure to contradict maximalist Israeli interpretations of the new US policy, related US policy initiatives such as the inauguration of an embassy that straddles the boundary of East and West Jerusalem, and a State Department decree to cease referring to the occupied Palestinian territories as occupied territories,[24] the suspicion that the Trump administration has wilfully embraced Israel’s position on Jerusalem without reservation while declining to state this explicitly is difficult to avoid. In this respect, it also merits mention that the leadership of the Democratic Party, in sharp contrast to its position on other foreign and domestic policy matters, has largely applauded Trump’s declaration of recognition and the May 2018 inauguration of the US Embassy in Jerusalem, and has only criticized it for not coming soon enough.[25]
Of particular concern with regard to Trump’s explanations for his administration’s policies on Jerusalem is the claim that “This is nothing more, or less, than a recognition of reality.”[26] It is a statement that may well have further, and critical, implications, not only within and around Jerusalem, but throughout the occupied Palestinian and indeed Arab territories, where during the past half century Israel has systematically altered the legal, administrative, demographic, and physical reality. It is certainly true that the phenomenon of recognizing realities illegally created by Israel was not pioneered by Trump; George W. Bush, for example, in 2004 stated that “realities on the ground” – i.e. Israeli settlements in the West Bank – would have to be taken into account in any Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Objectionable as this endorsement of illegitimate Israeli policies undoubtedly is, there is nevertheless the crucial difference that Bush withheld formal recognition pending the conclusion of an agreement. Trump, by contrast, has unilaterally sought to legitimize Israeli faits accomplis, and in so doing emboldened it to continue and expand its violations of international law and the international consensus with impunity.[27]
The Regional and International Response
Within two weeks of the Trump declaration, the UN Security Council convened to vote on a draft resolution that can only be described as a pointed slap in the face of American diplomacy. With the exception of the US, every Security Council member – including three NATO and four EU members, Japan, and a number of US client states including Egypt and Ukraine – voted for the draft, with no abstentions. The motion failed only because the US as a permanent member has veto power.
The draft resolution, which is appended to this document, provides a powerful restatement of the international consensus on Jerusalem and rejects the US measures and explanations virtually line by line.
Several days later the General Assembly, meeting in an emergency session, passed a similar resolution 128-9 with Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Togo, and the United States voting against.[28] In her subsequent banquet to reward those states which stood with the US, Ambassador Nikki Haley felt compelled to also invite thirty-five delegates who abstained on the vote. Separately, the EU, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference and a majority of their member states also rejected the Trump declaration.[29]
The global outrage reflected a series of concrete concerns. Among these are that:
- The United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council had wilfully violated international law and the international consensus on Jerusalem, pursuant to which no sovereignty within any part of the Holy City will be recognized in the absence of a negotiated political settlement;
- The United States had wilfully violated Security Council resolutions that explicitly prohibit member states from maintaining diplomatic missions in Jerusalem;
- The United States, which under President Trump had taken, at best, an agnostic position on the international consensus for a two-state settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dealt a seemingly deliberate body blow to a central pillar of this framework because a Palestinian state without a capital in East Jerusalem is inconceivable;
- The Trump declaration on Jerusalem spoke only to Israeli interests and aspirations in Jerusalem, and made no mention of Palestinian rights and aspirations, as if these are non-existent;
- In a situation where Israel is already putting both the prospects for an end to the occupation of East Jerusalem and the Status Quo at Jerusalem’s most sacred locations under continuous pressure, the Trump declaration is tantamount to pouring oil on a growing fire, with unforeseen consequences at a time when the region is already consumed by conflict and instability;
- The Trump declaration dealt a severe blow to the already moribund prospects for meaningful Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
- The Trump declaration establishes an extremely dangerous precedent since it can use its power and influence to persuade other states to mimic its policies and apply the same approach to other core issues in the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
The absence of anticipated eruptions of popular outrage throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds in the immediate aftermath of the Trump declaration led the US, Israel, and other proponents of US policy to proclaim that concerns about security and stability in the region and beyond were highly exaggerated, if not illusory. Yet those drawing such conclusions primarily betrayed their shallow understanding of politics, militancy and – as the Gaza marches in the spring of 2018 demonstrated – Israel’s seemingly limitless capacity to fan the flames of Palestinian indignation. Furthermore, at the leadership level, the Palestinians repudiated further diplomatic engagement with a US administration that they correctly viewed as incapable of serving as an effective arbiter. Effectively, Trump left them with no other political option.
Conclusion
It is not inconceivable that a determination to dismantle the rules-based international system, in this instance represented by the international consensus on Jerusalem, played a role in the Trump administration’s rupture with precedent and partner. Be that as it may, the United States has now presented the international community with a moment of truth.
At one level, Trump has performed the valuable if unintended servicef conclusively demonstrating to those who still believed otherwise that the existing diplomatic framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of bilateral negotiations between the occupier and occupied under exclusive US auspices, cannot and should not be resurrected.
More importantly, it presents the international community with a challenge. Not one of reversing the Trump policy, which at least in the short term enjoys the enthusiastic support of the Democratic Party leadership, is an illusory objective. But rather, one of constructing alternatives to an obsolete approach which looks to Washington for leadership and salvation. As Israel actively asserts its sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem through laws, development projects, and further displacement of the Palestinian population, such alternatives begin with a firm commitment to existing principles and a refusal to compromise them in the forlorn hope of enticing this American administration to modify its position. It entails putting principles that are often enunciated as the pre-requisites for Israeli-Palestinian co-existence into political practice, and beginning the process of replacing Israeli impunity with accountability.
In the immediate term, the international community, and particularly those who wield influence in the region, will need to expend considerable effort to ensure the maintenance of the Status Quo at the Holy City’s holy sites. At the same time, they will need to devise firewalls that can prevent Washington from applying its policy approach to Jerusalem in other aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prepare plans to ameliorate the consequences if it does. Within the larger scheme of things, this community must develop the will and capacity to act in the defence of its own interests. Pursued correctly, the prospects for obtaining American popular and elite support for such a program may be growing better. In due course, such preferences can percolate into the political arena.
Endnotes
[1] Jody Boudreault and Yasser Salaam (eds.), U.S. Official Statements: The Status of Jerusalem (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 25.
[2] Ibid., p. 35.
[3] Ibid., p. 48.
[4] “Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East”. Available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/90182d
[5] “James Baker’s Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians, October 18 1991”. Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/letter_of_assurance.pdf.
[6] In this respect see “Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters: January 1, 2001”. Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Peace%20Puzzle/12_Palestinian%20Response%20to%20the%20Clinton%20Parameters_January%201%202001.pdf.
[7] John Kerry, Secretary of State, “Remarks on Middle East Peace” (28 December 2016). Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm.
[8] Consult, for example, the interview with former AIPAC functionary and US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, “The Untold Story of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995”, Foreign Policy (11 May 2018). Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/11/the-untold-story-of-the-jerusalem-embassy-act-of-1995/.
[9] United States. “Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.” Government Publishing Office. Available at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ45/pdf/PLAW-104publ45.pdf.
[10] United States. “Presidential Determination No. 2018–02 of December 6, 2017.” Government Publishing Office. Available at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-12-26/pdf/2017-28027.pdf#page=1.
[11] European Council. “Venice Declaration.” European External Action Service, European Union. Available at: www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.
Roger Heacock, “Europe and Jerusalem: From Unholy Cacophony to Holy Alliance” in Jerusalem Quarterly Issue 55 (Autumn 2013), pp. 68-77, p. 70.
[12] Council of The European Union. “2985th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting.” Council of the European Union. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/111829.pdf.
[13] Associated Press. “TEXT OF FINAL DECLARATION AT ARAB LEAGUE MEETING.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Sept. 1982. Available at: www.nytimes.com/1982/09/10/world/text-of-final-declaration-at-arab-league-meeting.html.
[14] Agence France-Presse (AFP). “Text of Arab Peace Initiative Adopted at Beirut Summit.” 28 Mar. 2002, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empa/dv/1_arab-initiative-beirut_/1_arab-initiative-beirut_en.pdf
[15] Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. “1st Session of The Islamic Summit Conference.” Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Available at: www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/1/DecReport-1st%20IS.html.
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. “THIRD ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE.” Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Available at: www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum.html.
[16] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Statement Regarding Palestinian-Israeli Settlement.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Media Questions Following a Meeting of the SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, April 24, 2018 - Ministers' Speeches, 6 Apr. 2017. Available at: www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2717182
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan's Position on the Peace in the Middle East.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 13 Jan. 2015. Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/stance.html .
Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People's Republic of China. “Chinese President Makes Four-Point Proposal for Settlement of Palestinian Question.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People's Republic of China, 6 May 2013. Available at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2868_663726/2870_663730/t1037823.shtml.
[17] It is noteworthy that whereas the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act states: “(1) Jerusalem should remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic and religious group are protected; (2) Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel; and (3) the United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem”, the 2017 resolution (S. Res 176), also referenced by Trump, goes one step further to declare that “Jerusalem should remain the undivided capital of Israel”. Available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-115sres176ats/pdf/BILLS-115sres176ats.pdf
[18] Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem.” The White House, The United States Government, 6 Dec. 2017. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/.
[19] Sheldon Adelson Offers to Help Pay for U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem” Haaretz (February 23 2018). Available at:
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/adelson-reportedly-offers-to-help-pay-for-jerusalem-embassy-1.5845687 Adelson subsequently offered to pay the costs of establishing a US embassy in Jerusalem.
[20] Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem.” The White House, The United States Government, 6 Dec. 2017. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/.
[21] Tillerson, Rex W. “Remarks With Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz at a Joint Press Availability.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 7 Dec. 2017. Available at: www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/12/276333.htm.
[22] Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting.” The White House, The United States Government, 25. Jan. 2018. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-bilateral-meeting-davos-switzerland/
[23] Tillerson, Rex W. “Press Availability With Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 12 Feb. 2018. Available at: www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2018/02/278210.htm.
Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting.” The White House, The United States Government, 5 Mar. 2018. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-bilateral-meeting-2/.
[24] Carol Morello, “State Department strikes reproductive rights, ‘Occupied Territories’ from human rights report” Washington Post (April 20, 2018). Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-strikes-reproductive-rights-occupied-territories-from-annual-report/2018/04/20/46ef0874-44a6-11e8-ad8f-27a8c409298b_story.html?utm_term=.e14f28fe3850; U.S. State Department report on human rights practices for 2017. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=277245.
[25] Mallory Shelbourne, “Schumer applauds Trump on moving US Embassy to Jerusalem” The Hill (May 14 2018). Available at:
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/387566-schumer-applauds-trump-on-moving-us-embassy-to-jerusalem
[26] Office of the Press Secretary. “Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem.” The White House, The United States Government, 6 Dec. 2017. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/.
[27] Omar M. Dajani. “Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of the Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process” in Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 37 no. 1. (Fall 2007). pp. 24-38, p. 33.
[28] United Nations, General Assembly Resolution ES 10/19 Status of Jerusalem A/RES/ES-10/19 (December 21, 2017) Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/jerusalem-ga-10th-emergency-special-session-resolution/
[29] See, for example, Cnaan Lipshiz, “Following Trump’s Declaration, EU Doubles Down on Jerusalem Policy”, The Times of Israel (7 December 2017). Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/following-trumps-declaration-eu-doubles-down-on-jerusalem-policy/; Reuters, “Trump Jerusalem move 'a dangerous violation' of international law, says Arab League: Foreign ministers says US president’s decision threatens to send the region into ‘violence and chaos’”, The Guardian (10 December 2017). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/10/trump-jerusalem-arab-league-dangerous-violation-international-law; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Summit Blasts Trump Decision on Jerusalem”, VOAnews.com (13 December 2017). Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-world-meeting-regarding-trump-jerusalem-choice/4161688.html.